JAINA AND NYĀYA VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHIES

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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DECLARATION

I, Suseela.K.C., hereby declare that this thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sanskrit has not formed in full or in part the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship or any other recognition.

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PREFACE

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are two major members of the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy. These two had their own independent development in the ancient times. Later they were combined into one to give a scientific foundation characterized by the description of worldly objects and strong logical arguments to all philosophical thoughts in India. Jaina is a religious sect which arose in revolt against the decay in the orthodox Indian society. Its followers developed a philosophical system following the method of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika but making much modifications in their principles to suit the line of the new religion. Like Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika, the Jaina Philosophy also have had its influence on later Indian thoughts. Eventhough a number of studies are available on these three Darśanas separately, no comprehensive study of the three in a comparative method has so far come up. So the present researcher tries to make a comparison of Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika and Jaina Darśanas in different aspects.

The first chapter of the thesis contains a brief history of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Jaina Philosophies. The

second chapter discusses the main principles of Nyāya Darśana; the third, the main principles of the Vaiśeṣika; and the fourth, the main principles of the Jaina Philosophy. The fifth chapter compares some aspects of the three philosophies. The sixth is a comparison of the main principles. Finally, there is the conclusion summing up the important similarities and dissimilarities.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AS	- Arthaśastra
BD	- Bhāratīya Darśana
Bhp	- Bhaṣāpariccheda
DS	- Dravya Saṁgraha
DSV	- Dravya Saṁgraha Vṛtti
HIL	- A History of Indian Logic
HIP	- A History of Indian Philosophy
Kir	- Kiraṇāvali
MBh	- Mahābhārata
MS	- Manusaṁhita.
MBh	- Nyāya bhāṣya
NK	- Nyāya Kandali
NKS	- Nyāya Kusumāñjali
NM	- Nyāya Mañjar
NS	- Nyāya Sūtra
NSar	- Nyāya Sāra
NSG	- Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama
NSPP	- Nyāya Sārapadapañcika
NV	- Nyāya Vārtika
PBh	- Praśastapādabhāṣya
PMS	- Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra.
PNT	- Pramāṇanayatattvalokālaṅkāra
PS	- Pravacanasāra
RV	- Rajavārtika
SDS	- Ṣaddarśanasaṁgraha
SM	- Siddhānta muktāvali

SS	-	Sarvārthasiddhi
SVM	-	Syādvādamañjari
TBh	-	Tarkabhāṣa
TCM	-	Tattvacintāmaṇi
TDTV	-	Tātparyadipikātatparyavṛtti
TS	-	Tattvārthādhigamasūtra
TSG	-	Tarkasaṅgraha.
TSGD	-	Tarkasaṅgraha Dīpika
TSN	-	Nīlakaṇṭhi on TSG
TSV	-	Tattvaslokavārtika.
YBh	-	Yogabhāṣya.


CHAPTER I

NYĀYA - VAIŚEṢIKA AND JAINA PHILOSPHIES - A BRIEF HISTORY

Traditional Indian Philosophy really consists of a wide and colourful spectrum of world views as rich in variety, as profound in depth and as refined in the subtlety of its analysis and interpretation of human experience as the philosophies articulated by any of the cultures of the world. It includes theistic as well as atheistic schools of thought.

The basis for classifying the schools of traditional Indian Philosophy is their relation to the Vedas. Schools which accept the authority of the Vedas are called the orthodox schools (*Āstika*); schools which reject Vedic authority are heterodox ones (*Nāstika*). Among those which prima facie accept the authority of the Vedas, there are two subdivisions namely (1) those that are based directly on the Vedic texts and (2) those which accept the Vedic texts but base themselves on independent grounds.

The schools and the scheme of classification can be tabulated as follows



The present investigator selected mainly Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika and Jaina Darśanas for the study. Eventhough a number of studies are available on these Darśanas separately, no one study is noted by the Researcher taking these three *Darśanas* together. So the investigator, in this study, tries to

make comparative study of Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika and Jaina *Darśanas* in different aspects.

There is a famous poem which narrates the greatness of Logic and quoted by Kauṭilya as ;

pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām śaśvadānvīkṣikīmatā[1].

Ānvīkṣikī (Logic) has ever been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues.

This word *Ānvīkṣikī* was previously connected with two subjects, the soul and the theory of reasons.

Kauṭilya recognised *Ānvīkṣikī* as a distinct branch of study. The distinction between *Ātmavidyā* and *Ānvīkṣikī* is that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of the soul, the latter contained reasons supporting those assertions. *Ānvīkṣikī* dealt in fact with two subjects - *Ātman* (soul) and *Hetu* (the theory of reason). *Ānvīkṣikī* treating of the soul was called *Darśana* (Philosophy, literally signifies seeing). It is the science which enables us to see our soul. The *Ānvīkṣikī*, in virtue of the theory of reasons

predominating it, was *Hetuśāstra* or *Hetuvidyā* - the science of reasoning, as it is evident from the *Manusaṁhitā*[2] and *Mahābhārata*[3] etc. It is also called *Tarkavidyā* - the art of debate and *Vādavidyā* - the art of discussion, inasmuch as it dealt with rules for carrying on disputations in learned assemblies called *Pariṣad*. The *Ānvīkṣikī* was, as we see later, also called *Nyāya Śāstra* - the science of true reasoning.

In the first stage logic was generally designated as *Ānvīkṣikī - Hetuśastra* or *Tarka vidyā*. In the second stage it became *Nyāya Śāstra*, as we find in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* .

The word Nyāya popularly signifies 'right or justice'[4]. The Nyāya śāstra is therefore the science of right judgement or true reasoning. Technically the word Nyāya signifies syllogism or a speech of five parts and *Ānvīkṣikī* was called *Nyāya Śāstra* when Nyāya constituted its special topic.

As mentioned in the above table Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Darsanas developed on their independent grounds, even though both *Darśanas* have same goal, i.e., attaining the *Mokṣa* by getting the real knowledge of the categories (*Padārtha tattvajñānāt*) , there are certain marked differences in the

doctrine as taught in the two Schools. Speaking of the systems, as distinguished from the Sūtras in which their teachings are embodied, we can state that the Vaiśeṣika is the older of the two *Darśanas*.

BRIEF HISTORY OF VAIŚEṢIKA DARŚANA

The word Vaiśeṣika is derived from Viśeṣa which means particulars and the Darśana is so designated because according to it, diversity and not unity is the root of the universe.

The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kaṇāda is in ten chapters, each of which is divided into two sections called *Āhnikas*. The earliest extant commentary upon these sūtras is *Praśastapādabhāṣya* written by Praśastapāda, but it does not follow in its exposition the order of the Sūtras. It seems to be a restatement rather than a commentary and in restating the position of the school, it considerably develops it. For example the clear formulation of the doctrine of creation with God as creator is found for the first time in *Praśastapādabhāṣya* in the history of the Vaiśeṣika School. On account of

such developments the work is to be looked upon more as an independent authority on the Darśana than as a commentary.

This *Praśastapādabhāṣya* has been expounded by several writers of whom Udayana and Śrīdhara are the most important. Of them Udayana is the more celebrated particularly on account of his *Kusumāñjali*, which has become a classic of Indian theism. His commentary is known as the *'Kiraṇāvali'*. 'Śrīdhara's commentary bears the title of *Nyāya Kandalī*. Both give a most lucid exposition of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. The *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkara Miśra is a commentary on the Sūtra in the common acceptance of the term, but owing to the lateness of its author it cannot always be regarded as faithful to the original.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NYAYADARSANA

The Nyāya Sūtra or aphorisms of true reasoning, of Gautama is in five chapters, each of which is divided into two sections named *Āhnikas*. It contains references to the Saṅkya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga Mīmāṁsā and Buddhistic systems of Phi-

losophy. Akṣapāda is the author of Nyāya-Sūtra[5]. In the early commentaries on the Nyāya-Sūtra, the author of the Sūtra is distinctly named as Akṣapāda. In the Padmapurāṇa[6] and Skandapurāṇa[7], the Nyāya Śāstra is treated to have been expounded by Gautama. Viśvanātha in his Nyāya Sūtra Vṛtti called the Nyāya-Sūtra as Gautama Sūtra, i.e., the sūtras of Gautama.

The Nyāya Sūtra treats mainly of five objects.

(1) *Pramāṇa* - the means of right knowledge

(2) *Prameya* - the object of right knowledge

(3) *Vāda* - the debate or discussion

(4) *Avayava* - the members of Syllogism, and

(5) *Anyamataparīkṣa*- an examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines[8].

The earliest commentary extant on *Nyāya-Sūtra* is the *Nyāyabhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana[9]. In it there are references to previous logicians designated as '*eke*'(some) '*kecit*' (certain) or '*anye*'(others) who were perhaps authors of commentaries which have not come to us.

Uddyotakara was the author of a sub-commentary on the *Nyāya-Sūtra* called *Nyāya-Vārttika*. Udayanācārya wrote

several other works such as the *Kusumāñjali, Ātmatattva-viveka, Kiraṇāvali* and *Pariśiṣta*. *Nyāya Vārttika* has been explained in the *Tātparyatīkāpariśuddi*. These are the principal *Brāhmaṇa* commentators on the *Nyāya-Sūtra*. Subsequently there arose a number of commentators such as Vardhamāna, author of the *Nyāya-nibandhaprakāśa*, Vācaspati Miśra the Junior, author of *Nyāyatattvāloka*, Viśvanātha, the author of *Nyāya Vṛtti*, etc.

The *Nyāya līlāvatī*[10] which is an expository treatise on Vaiśeṣika Philosophy deals with six categories viz.,

(1) substance *(dravya)*

(2) quality *(guṇa)*

(3) action *(karman)*

(4) generality *(sāmānya)*

(5) particularity *(viśeṣa)* and

(5) inherence *(samavāya)*.

Commentaries on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* are available

(1) *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa* by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya

(2) *Nyāyalīlāvatī dīdhiti* by Raghunātha śiromaṇi

(3) *Nyāyalīlāvatī kaṇṭhābharaṇa* by Śaṅkaramiśra.

(4) *Nyāyalīlāvatī Prakāśa* Viveka by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa

One more writer named Jayanta Bhaṭṭa wrote a commentary on a select few of Gautama Sūtras named *Nyāya Mañjarī*. It is a rich store house of information on Philosophical thought. This concludes the whole of *Prācīna* phase of the history of the Nyāya.

NAVYA NYĀYA SYSTEM

Gaṅgeśa (1200 A.D.) the author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* was the founder of the Modern Nyāya School known as *Navya Nyāya*[11]. This great work gradually threw into the shade earlier ones, including the two sutras. Gaṅgeśa made a great work *Cintāmaṇi* taking of both views here and there. For example he has taken categories from Vaiśeṣika and Pramāṇas from Nyāya Darśana. There are several commentaries and subcommentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Raghunātha's commentary on Gaṅgeśas work, which is the best of its class, is known as *Dīdhiti*.

Gadādhara who belongs to the same school commented upon it, known as *Gādādharī*[12]. Amongst the numerous manuals treating of the system, we have to mention the two most important, the *Tarkasaṁgraha*[13] and *Kārikāvalī*, which have been explained by the authors themselves in the *Dīpika* and the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* respectively.

JAINA DARŚANA

The Jaina Darśana has a very important role in our Indian Philosophy, by its distinct narration. The Jaina Darśana is treated not only like a Darśana but also it is to be said as a religion. At present also the followers of the Jaina religion (Jainas) have spread out all over the country.

Jainism derives its name from the word '*Jina*' which means one who has conquered his passions and achieved mastery over his self. Jainism is said to have its origin in prehistoric times. The Jainas recount the names of twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkaras*, ferry-men across the river of transmigration as the prophets of their religion. Ṛṣabhadeva is the first among



them, and Vardhamāna was the last *Tīrthaṅkara*. But historical evidence is available only about Pārśvanātha, who lived in 9th century B.C., and Vardhamāna, also called Mahāvīra, who belonged to the 6th century B.C. Mahāvīra was a contemporary of the Buddha.

As a heterodox School, Jainism rejects the authority of the Veda. Jainism is also pessimistic in its outlook on mundane life. But it believes in the promise and possibility of liberation. The severe asceticism of Jainism is in sharp contrast to the hedonism of the Cārvākas. Jainism has been characterised as realistic, pluralistic and relativistic because it believes in the reality of the external objective world unlike, say, Vedānta which denies the reality of the external world at the ultimate metaphysical level. It is pluralistic because it believes that the souls are many in number and they continue to be so for ever. Jainism is relativistic because it maintains that our judgements about the world are relative to our time and place.

THE MAIN TEXTS OF THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra of Umāsvāti, *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasenadivākara, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍdarśanavicāra* of Merutuṅga, *Pañcāstikāya Samaya Sāra* of Kundakundācārya, *Jainaslokavārttika* of Vidyānanda, *Ātmānuśasana* of Guṇabhadra, *Dravyasaṅgraha* of Nemicandra, *Tattvārthasāradīpika* of Sakalakīrti, etc., are the main texts of Jaina Philosophy.

NOTES

1. A.S. I.1.P.4
2. MS. 7-43
3. MBH. a-180, Verse 47.
4. HIL. I, P.40
5. HIL. I. P.47.
6. Uttarakhanda - cap.263.
7. Kalika Khanda - cap.17
8. HIL .I. P.49
9. HIL. III. P.115
10. HIL. III. P.387

11. HIL. II. P.405

12. HIL. III. P.481

13. HIL. III. P.388.

CHAPTER II

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

The Nyāya Philosophy is mainly concerned with Logic and secondarily with Ontology. Gautama mentions sixteen categories in Nyāya Sūtra, Viz, *Pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanadṛṣtāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpavitandāhetvābhāsachalajātinigrahasthānānām tattvajñānāt nisreyasādhigamaḥ.//*[1]

It is the knowledge of the real essence (or true character) of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the highest Good : The means of right cognition, the objects of right congnition , doubt, motive, example, theory, factors of inference, hypothetical reasoning, demonstrated truth, discussion, disputation, wrangling, fallacious reason, perversion, casuistry and clinchers[2].

It deals with sources of knowledge, viz, perception, inference, comparison and testimony and conditions of their

validity and the nature of world, soul and God.

PRAMĀṆAS

Pramāṇa is the valid knowledge of an object. *Pramāṇa* is the instrument by means of which the self knows an object. *Prameya* is the object that is known. According to Nyāya Philosophy, there are four Pramāṇas viz, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony[3].

PERCEPTION

Gautama defines perception as the knowledge which is produced by the contact of an object with a sense - organ, undefinable, determinate in harmony with its object (*indriyā rthasannikarṣotpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*)[4]

According to Naiyāyikas, there are three contacts needed for an external perception. Those are (1) of the soul with the mind, (2) of the mind with the sense-organ and (3) of the sense-organ with an object. (*atmā manasā, manaḥ indriyeṇa, indriyam arthena*)[5].

The sense-organs are directed by the *manas* which is directed by the self. Conjunction of the sense-organs with the *manas* and conjunction of the *manas* with the self are the general causes of Perception. The contact of sense-organs with an object is a special cause of perception. Perception is the immediate knowledge of a present object. This perception is different from other pramanas which are not produced by the contact of sense- object.

There are two kinds of perception (i) Indeterminate perception and (ii)Determinate perception. The ancient Nyāya regards the indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object as qualified by a substance, quality, action and genus, but devoid of a name. The determinate perception is the apprehension of it not just as qualified by these but associated with name. But the *Navya-Nyāya* regards the former as immediate, simple, non-relational apprehension of an object and its generic nature as unrelated to each other and the latter as mediate, relational synthetic apprehension of an object and its generic nature as related to each other.

Gautama's definition of perception is not applicable to *Yogic* perception. So Paṇḍita Govardhana, in his *Nyāya-bodhinī* - a commentary on *Tarkasaṅgraha* - and Viśvanātha, in his *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*[6], defined perception as immediate knowledge which is not derived through the medium of any other knowledge (*jñānākāraṇakam jñānampratyakṣam*). This definition is applicable to all kinds of perception and excludes other pramāṇas.

Gaṅgeśa accepts three kinds of extra - ordinary contact, viz, *sāmānya lakṣaṇa, jñāna lakṣaṇa* and *Yogaja lakṣaṇa*. Perception of smoke happens through ordinary contact. But the perception of generic character (*dhūmatvam*) is due to *Sāmānya lakṣaṇa pratyāsakti*, because all individuals (smokes) are not perceived through the sense-organs at a time. But they are indirectly perceived through the knowledge of their generic character. *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyāsakti* is the extra - ordinary contact through the knowledge of an object revived from a past perception of it. Visual perception of a fragrant sandal is due to the contact of the visual organ with the sandal and the recollection of its fragrants perceived in the past

through the olfactory organ owing to association[7].

Yogic perception is produced by an extra-ordinary contact brought about by meditation. There are two kinds of *Yogic* perception - *Yukta* and *Yuñjāna*. The former is the intuition without effort of a *Yogin*, who perceives all categories ever. The latter is the intuition of a *Yogin* who puts forth effort of will to perceive all objects.

The Nyāya advocates, the *Anyathākhyāti* (theory of error) which is also called *Viparītakhyāti*[8]. When one perceives the qualities of silver in a nacre it is an illusionary perception.

INFERENCE

Inference is the mediate knowledge of an object derived through the medium of the knowledge of invariable concomitance between two objects. First there is a perception of mark (*Liṅga*) or probans (*Sādhana*) in a subject (*Parvate dhūmaḥ dṛṣṭaḥ*). Secondly there is the recollection of invariable concomitance of the mark with the predicate, probandum (*Sādhyam*) (*Yatra yatra dhūmaḥ tatra agniḥ*). Thirdly,

there is the inference of the existence of an unperceived object in the subject (*Parvataḥ vahnimān*). This is inference for oneself (*Svārtha*)

Inference is mediate knowledge while perception is immediate knowledge. Perception apprehends present and mere objects while inference apprehends past, future and remote objects as well as present and near objects.

Inference is of two kinds

(1) Inference for oneself (*Svārthānumāna*)

(2) Inference for others (*Parārthānumāna*)[9]

Of them, inference for oneself is the cause of ones own inferential knowledge as already mentioned above.

But when one having inferred for oneself employs the five membered syllogism to make others understand the same, it is known as inference for others. The five members of the syllogism are *pratijna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya* and *nigamana*.

(1) The hill is fiery (*Pratijñā*)

(2) Because it is smoky (*Hetu*)

(3) Whatever is smoky is fiery

for example, a kitchen (*Udāharaṇa*)

(4) The hill has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire (*Upanaya*)

(5) So the hill is fiery (*Nigamana*)

Gautama mentions three kinds of inference - *Pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānytodṛṣṭa*[10].

Vātsyāyana gives two meanings of each of them[11]. A *pūrvavat* inference is the inference of an unperceived effect from a perceived cause. A future rainfall is inferred from clouds. *Śeṣavat* inference is the inference of an unperceived cause from a perceived effect. A past rainfall which is source of a river is inferred from its fullnes and muddiness of water which are perceived. *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is the inference of an imperceptible object from a perceived reason which is known to be uniformed, related to it. The movement of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the sky which are perceived.[12] Vātsyāyana gives other meanings also of this kind of inference. A *pūrvavat* inference is based on previous experience of invariable concomitance of two objects. The fire is inferred from a perceived smoke and the hill

The *śeṣavat* inference is inference by elimination. Sound is not substance because it inheres in one substance[13]. It is not an action, since it is a cause of another sound. It is not a community, a particularity or inherence. So it is a quality.

Sāmānyatodṛṣta inference is the inference of an unperceived object from a mark which is perceived though the relation between them is not perceived[14]. The existence of soul is inferred by the qualities of cognition, pleasure, desire, aversion and volition[15].

COMPARISON

Comparison is the means of knowing an unknown object through its resemblance with another well-known object. A person who is familiar with a cow, who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word *gavaya*, learns from a certain forester that the *gavaya* is similar to cow. He goes to a forest and perceives a strange animal similar to a cow and remembers the declaration. Then arises in him the knowledge : This is the animal denoted by the word *gavaya*[16].

TESTIMONY

Gautama defines Testimony as instruction of a trustworthy person, who speaks of things as the existing reality. Verbal Testimony is an instruction which is expressed in a sentence. Testimony is due to the knowledge of a sentence or words[17].

Testimony is of two kinds, Testimony about perceptible objects and Testimony about imperceptible objects. The modern Naiyāyikas divided Testimony into two kinds, Secular Testimony and Scriptural Testimony. The secular Testimony of trust worthy persons is valid. The Vedas are not impersonal, but personal compositions of God, and are therefore valid [18].

Testimony is expressed in a sentence which is a combination of words, conveying a meaning. Its comprehensibility depends upon certain conditions (1) The Verbal expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣā*), (2) Compatibility or mutual fitness of words (*Yogyatā*) and juxta position or proximity (*Sannidhi*) are the cause of the knowledge[19]. Of the meaning of a sentence, Verbal expectancy consists in the inability of a word to convey

the meaning of a sentence due to the absense of some other word. A sentence devoid of verbal expectancy is unauthoritative. eg., the words a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant, etc., are not authoritative as they are devoid of verbal expectancy.

Compatibility is non-contradiction of the sense. The sentence, sprinkle with fire is not authoritative owing to the absence of compatibility.

Juxta position is the utterance of words in quick succession. Words like bring ----a---cow etc. pronounced at long intervals are not authoritative owing to want of juxta position[20].

LIBERATION

Liberation is absolute cessation of pain and rebirth [21]. The body, the sense-organs, and the *Manas* are the causes of pain. At the time of dissolution, the soul becomes free from pain. The Nyāya view of Liberation, is the same as the Vaiśeṣikas view. Liberation is the complete extinction of the special qualities of the soul, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and impression. The

soul is free from congnition in the state of liberation . In Liberation the soul is devoid of merits and demerits and consequently free from pleasure and pain. True knowledge of the self ultimately leads to liberation through the destruction of merits and demerits and the consequent cessation of birth. Gautama defines Liberation as "*tadatyantavimokṣo apavargaḥ*". Absolute freedom from the aforesaid is final release [22].

Gautama gives a sequential order to attainment of Liberation, i.e., "*duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamidhyājñānānām uttarottarāpāyetadanantarāpāyādapavargaḥ*[23]."

There is a cessation of each member of the following series - Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and wrong Notion - the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to Final Release.

According to Naiyāyikas the liberation is the real knowledge of categories, that is mentioned in the aphorism of Nyaya Sūtra, Viz, *Pramānaprameyasamśaya prayojana - dṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpavitan*

dāhetvābhāsa chalajātinigrahasthānānām tattvajñānāt niśreyasādhigamaḥ.[24]

It is the knowledge of the real essence of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of highest good.

The means of right congnition, The object of right cognition, doubt, motive, example, theory, factors of inference, hypothetical reasoning, demonstrated truth, discussion, disputation, wrangling, fallacious reason, perversion, casuistry and clinchers. The practice of *Yoga*, austerities, the performance of duties and abstention from sins are subsidiary to the acquisition. Release can be achieved by intuition of the self. It destroyes false knowledge with its potencies and stops rebirth [25].

CAUSALITY

Nyāya gives an empirical definition of a cause. Udayana defines it as an invariable antecedent of an effect. Gaṅgeśa also defines a cause as an unconditional invariable antecedent of an effect. This definition applies to the inherent cause, the

non-inherent cause, and the efficient cause. A cause co-exists with the prior - non - existence of its effect and so it must be its antecedent (*Karyam prāgabhāvapratiyogi*)[26]. Though a cause is an immediate anticident of its effect, it is also synchronous with it. A conditional (*Anyathāsiddha*) antecedent depends upon other conditions in order to be followed by an effect, which is not necessary for its production. The Nyāya admits three kinds of cause, viz., the material cause, the non-inherent cause and the efficient cause.

SELF (*ĀTMAN*) AND TRANSMIGRATION

Nyāya arguments for the existence of the finite soul are similar to the Vaiśeṣikas' view. The Nyāya admits the perception of the self while the vaiśeṣika denies it. According to Nyāya, the self is an object of internal perception, inferred from marks, and known from the Testimony of the vedas. The self is an object of " I Cognition" or mental perception. It is perceived by intuition owing to a particular kind of conjuction of it with *manas* due to meditative trance[27].

The self is inferred from desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition[28]. The self is inferred from the synthesis of the sensations of colour, taste, smell and touch of an object into a unity of perception [29].

There is recognition of an object perceived by the right eye, which was perceived by the left eye in the past. If the sense-organs were conscious, one sense-organ could not recognise an object perceived by another sense-organ. 'I touch the same jar through the tactual organ which I perceived through the visual organ'. Here the jar is perceived by one sense-organ and touched by another sense-organ. These two perceptions are recognized as belonging to the same self. By the above said reasons the self is beyond the body and the sense organs.

The Nyāya concept of the self is the same as that of the Vaiśeṣikas'. It is a substance which has cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit. The first six qualities are transitory and the last three qualities are permanent.

The self is eternal and devoid of origin and end. The self is a substance because it is the inherent cause of cognitions. It is ubiquitous because it is an eternal and incorporeal substance. It is incorporeal because it is motionless. It has pre-existence and under goes transmigration until it achieves Liberation. It leaves a body and assumes another body. An organism is born and perishes, but a soul is unborn and immortal. The self has relative freedom of the will. Its freedom is limited by the divine will. It earns merits by free righteous actions, and demerits by free unrighteous actions. But its freedom is limited by the merits and demerits, acquired by free actions in the past births, though it can counteract them by free actions in future. Hence the freedom of the individual self is subject to divine will and the law of karman [30].

WORLD

The conception of the world is the same as the Vaiśeṣika view of it with slight variations. The world is composed of five physical elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. They are the atoms of the first four elements. Atoms are the

material cause of the world, while God is its efficient cause. Causation is real and object causation is teleological and subservient to the Moral Law of Karman. Atoms are combined with one another by God into gross material objects, living organs and the multiform world and adapted to the enjoyments and sufferings of individual souls in accordance with their merits and demerits.

NATURE OF GOD

According Naiyāyikas, God has a particular soul endowed with merit, knowledge, intuition and sovereignty. He is devoid of false knowledge. Uddyotakara tells God with eternal knowledge, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa recognizes five qualities of God, Viz., knowledge, happiness, desire, volition and merit which are eternal and regards him as free from pain, aversion, demerit, impression, false knowledge, attachment and delusion. God transcends the atoms, time, space and ether which are co-eternal with him. God creates the world of manifold objects in accordance with the merits and demerits of the fi-

nite souls for their enjoyment and sufferings. God's freedom is limited by the Law of *Karman*, which emanates from his moral will. So this limitation is self limitation. Souls cannot escape from the law of *karman*. God is omniscient and omnipotent and morally perfect while the individual souls have limited knowledge, limited powers and moral imperfections. God is the moral guide of the individual souls and the dispenser of fruits of the action. He lays down moral injunction and prohibitions for the good of mankind and favours their free actions with their fruits. Without his favour free human actions are ineffective[31]. Uddyotakara gives some arguments for the existence of God.

God is the efficient cause of the world and directs the atoms which are its material cause, and brings about their conjunction which is its non-inherent cause. The movements of atoms are supervised by an intelligent agent or God, because they are unconscious like an axe. This is the cosmological argument.[32].

Merits and demerits are supervised by an intelligent agent inorder to produce pleasures and sufferings of the indi-



vidual souls because they are instruments. They cannot be supervised by the individual souls because they are unconscious of them. So God, who is conscious of their moral deserts conjoins them. This is the moral argument [33].

Jayanta gives the teleological argument. The arrangement of mountains, rivers and other material objects are produced by an intelligent agent, like cloths produced by human agents. This arrangement of objects are not accidental but produced by God, who is Omniscient and Omnipotent.[34].

Udayana gives some arguments. The unconscious and inactive atoms cannot move themselves. God is the creator of motions, which is the cause of conjuction of the atoms into diads. So the two atoms of the diad are material cause, their conjunction is the non-inherent cause and the agency of God is efficient cause. God who is omniscient and omnipotent can know atoms create motion in them [35].

The whole Universe including the diads is destroyed by the will of God because they are destructible. He creates motion by his destructive will and disjoins the atoms of diads and the like. He is the destroyer of the world. Destruction of

the universe is beyond the power of the individual souls[36].

The validity of the Vedas which are accepted as authoritative by great saints, is due to the reliability of God who is their speaker. It is not due to the authority of non - omniscient seers who are ignorant of the supersensible entities mentioned therein. It is guaranteed by God who is the Omniscient creator of the moral injunctions and prohibitions [37].

God is the creator of the moral Law, which is not an impersonal moral imperative. It is the property of a reliable person who imposes the moral Law upon persons.

It is a personal command of God which impels them to perform righteous actions and abstain from unrighteous actions. This is the moral argument for the existence of God. The sentences in Vedas are creations of a person because they are sentences, like sentences composed by men. Just as the *kumārasambhava* was composed by Kālidasa, so the Vedas were composed by God.

NOTES

1. NS.I.1.1.
2. NSG .vl.I. I.1.1.
3. NS.I.1.1.
4. NS. NBh.I.1.4
5. NBh. on NS.P.20
6. SM
7. TCM. P.556
8. H.I.L. P.380
9. TSG P.29
10. NS. NBh. I.1.5
11. NBh. P.24
12. NV. I.1.5
13. NBh. P.25
14. NBh. P.25
15. NBh.I.1.5
16. NS. NBh. I.1.6
17. NS. NBh I.1.7
18. NS. NBh. I.1.8

19. TSG. TSGD. P.24

20. TSG. TSGD. P.42

21. NS. NBh. I.1.22

22. NS. NBh. I.1.22

23. NS. NBh. I.1.2

24. NS. NBh. I.1.1

25. NS. NBh I.1.2 & 22.

26. TSG.P.18

27. NBh. I.1.3.

28. NS. NBh.I.1.10. III.2.36-40

29. NBh. III.I.1-3

30. NS. NBh. II.2.64-69, 3-36 & 45

31. NS. IV. 1.21.

32. NV. IV.1.21

33. NV. IV.1.21

34. NM. P.184-187

35. NM. P. 184-187

36. NKS. P.58-59

37. NKS. P.62.

CHAPTER III
MAIN PRINCIPLES OF VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

Kaṇāda (300 B.C) the author of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, is the founder of the Vaiśeṣika System. Kaṇāda brings all objects under Six categories. They are substance (*Dravya*), quality (*Guṇa*) action or motion (*Karman*) generality (*Sāmānya*), particularity (*Viśeṣa*) and inherence (*Samavāya*)[1].

Kaṇāda did not mention negation in the categories. The late Vaiśeṣikas added the seventh category of negation.

Padārtha means, the meaning of a word. It is an object of valid knowledge and capable of being named. It is knowable and nameable. The first six categories have existence, nameability and knowability. They are objects of the positive notion of being.

The three categories of substance, quality and action are related to beinghood (*Sattā*) which subsists in them[2]. The three categories of generality, particularity and inherence are

related to themselves and devoid of relation to *sattā*. They are neither causes nor effects. They are eternal and incapable of being expressed by the word object. They are non-spatial and timeless ontological entities. Substance, quality and action are causes capable of producing effects. They exist in time and space[3]. The categories are briefly narrated below.

SUBSTANCE (*DRAVYA*)

Kaṇāda defines a substance as a thing which has qualities and action and which is the inherent cause of an effect (*Kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇamiti dravyalakṣaṇam*)[4]. It differs from its qualities and actions because it is their substrate.

A substance has genus of substance which inheres in it. Substances are eternal and non-eternal. Non-eternal substances consist of parts, and are produced by their combination and destroyed by their separation. But the simple and partless substances like the atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal. They are neither produced nor destroyed. They are self existent, independent and endowed with particulari-

ties. Space, time, ether, and souls are incorporeal and ubiquitous (*Vibhu*) or eternal. Mind is atomic and eternal. It is neither produced nor destroyed [5].

EARTH

Earth has the genus of earth. Of the substances earth is that which has odour (as its inherent quality) Even though its special quality is odour, it has colour, taste, touch, number, magnitude, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, acquired fludity and velocity. It has many kinds of colour. It has six kinds of taste: sweet, sour, salt, bitter etc. It has two kinds of smell, fragrant and foul. Its touch is neither hot, nor cold, but luke - warm. It is of two varieties, eternal and non eternal. Eternal is atomic and non-eternal is product. Again it is three fold : body, organ and object. Body is that as of human beings. Organ is that which grasp odour, i.e., the olfactory organ. And it abides at the tip of the nose. The earthly objects are like clay, stone and such other things.

WATER

The genus of water inheres in water. Its special quality

is cold touch. It has colour, taste, natural fluidity, viscidity, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight and velocity[6]. It has white colour, sweet taste and cold touch. Viscidity is the quality of the water only.

Water is eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of water are eternal and non-eternal are of the nature of products. It is again of three varieties, body, organ and object. Its body is in the region of *Varuṇa*, organ is that of taste organ. Objects are rivers, lakes and the like [7].

FIRE

The genus of fire inheres in fire which has hot touch, as its special quality. The fire has colour, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, acquired fludity and velocity[8]. Fire is eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is of the nature of atoms and non-etrnal is of the nature of product. It is again of three kinds - body organ and object. The body is well-known in the solar region. The visual organ is composed of light and preceives colour. The

object is of four kinds, earthly, heavenly, gastric and mineral.

The light of the visual organ has unmanifested colour and touch which are not perceptible[9].

AIR

The genus of air inheres in air which, possesses touch without colour. It is two fold, eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is of the nature of atoms and non-eternal is of the nature of product[10]. Again it is three-fold, owing to its classification into body, organ and object. Body is found in the world of wind God. The tactual organ which pervades the body is composed of air and perceives touch. Object is the cause of tremor of trees. The air that circulates within the body is the vital breath. Though one, it is denoted variously as *prāṇa, apāna* etc. Owing to different places, air has touch, number, magnitude, distinctness conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity. Its touch is neither hot nor cold.

There are atoms of earth, water, fire and air which are eternal. They are neither created nor destroyed. They are combined into composite substances which are produced and

destroyed. The qualities of atoms are eternal, but those of composite products are non-eternal.

ETHER

Ākāśa is one, ubiquitous, eternal, imperceptible substance which is characterised by the distinctive quality of sound. Ether is one individual and has no genus. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from other eternal substances. It is one, since sound has no difference in land. It has different degrees of loudness only. There are no different kinds of sound, which proves that there are no difference in ether.

Ether is ubiquitous because it has contact with all corporeal substances of limited magnitude (*Sarvamūrtadravya saṁyogitvam vibhutvaṁ*)[11]. It is pervasive since it is impenetrable and unresisting. Ether is eternal because it is ubiquitous. It is neither produced nor destroyed.

SPACE

Space is one ubiquitious, eternal, partless substance. It is an individual which has no genus of space. It has a par-

ticularity which distinguishes it from ether, time, souls and minds and atoms of earth, water, fire and air. All material things exist in space and maintain their relative positions in it. It has no special quality, but it has number, magnitude, distinctnes, conjunction and disjunction[12]. If there is no space the existence of things also not possible. They interpenetrate one another.

Space is inferred from the cognitions of different directions. Space is the efficient cause (congnitions) of directions. If space were non-eternal their spatial relations would not be possible[13]. It is one and therefore distinct. It is ubiquitous and therefore eternal. It is imperceptible[14].

Space is different from Ether. Ether has a specific quality. Ether is the inherent cause of sound, but space is the general cause of all effects, but not the inherent cause of sound

TIME (*KĀLA*)

Time is one, ubiquitous, eternal substance. It is an individual and has no genus. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from ether, space, souls, minds (*Manas*) and atoms

of earth, water, fire and air. *It is a real and objective* substance.

Time is inferred from temporal remoteness and temporal proximity which subsist in new by created substances. Temporal remoteness is produced in an old substance after the lapse of this sun from its production[15]. Time is inferred from the congnitions of some simultaneity-- succession, slowness, quickness, oldness and youth which are its marks [16]. Time is inferred as the efficient cause of production, persistence and destruction of all effects[17]. Time is three-fold, past, present and future. Time is the cause of moments, hours, days, months years and the like. These are all artificial divisions of time. Time is one since the marks of priority, posteriority, succession, etc., are the same. Time is ubiquitous because it has conjuctions with all corporeal substance of limited magnitude which depends on its ubiquity[18]. It is partless. It is eternal since it cannot be destroyed by the division of parts[19].

SOUL (*ĀTMAN*)

Ātman cannot be perceived through the external sense-organ. It is an object of inference. Different sensible qualities are perceived through the different sense-organs, which are the instruments of kwoledge[20]. Knowledge as an effect must have a material cause. The self is its material cause in which it inheres[21]. The activity of the sense organs requires an agent, who uses them. The body, the sense-organs and the *manas* cannot be the agent, since they are conscious. They require the individual self as the agent, who uses them as organs of experience [22].

Pleasure, pain, desire, avertion and volition are qualities of the self. They are not perceived by the external sense-organs. They are experiences as 'I feel pleasure' (*Ahaṁ sukhī*) I feel pain (*Ahaṁ duḥkhī*), etc. This ego consciousness refers to self. The pleasure and pain are felt in connection with different parts of the body, I feel pleasure in the foot, I feel pain in the head. So these pleasure and pain are not special qualities of body and sense-organs, but are special qualities of a substance which pervades the entire body of it. The spe-

cial qualities of soul are perceived through the *manas*. Recollection and recognition prove the existence of the self. The self is the substratum of these qualities. Recollection proves the unity and identity of an individual self. Recognition also proves the permanence and identity of the self[23].

The vital acts of inspiration and expiration, the opening and closing of the eyes, the growth of the body, self recuperation of wounds, the movement of the *manas* and the impression of the sense-organs prove the existence of the self.

Finally, apperception proves the existence of the self. Special qualities are perceived their sense-organs. Some of its qualities are remembered. They combine into a single experience and are referred to as an external object by the self, by its synthetic acts of apperception. All these said above are the arguments for the existence of ones own self.[24].

The voluntary actions of the body which realize good and avoid evil prove the existence of another self, which directs the body like the movements of a chariot are guided by a charioter. The voluntary movements are the outward expressions of the volitions of a self. Thus we infer the existence of

other individual souls after the analogy of our own souls[25].

The vaisesikas recognize the plurality of the individual souls, which is inferred from the variety of experiences and conditions of different souls. Some are happy, while others are miserable, some are bound while others are liberated. These differences in the status of individuals prove the existence of many souls.

According to Vaiśeṣika, the plurality of individual souls is confirmed by the scriptures also. The *Upaniṣads* speak of two beautiful birds residing in the same tree, one enjoying the sweet fruit and other merely looking on. They speak of the individual soul and the supreme soul residing in the same body, the individual self being subject to happiness and misery, and the supreme soul, the inner controller being a mere spectator without experiencing happiness and misery.

Even in the state of liberation the finite soul retains its integrity and is not merged in God. Each soul has its particularity by virtue of which it is distinguished from the other souls and God. Each soul is eternal and its particularity is eternal.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition,

merit, demerit and disposition are the special qualities of individual self. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction are its generic qualities. It is ubiquitous.

MANAS (MIND)

*M*anas is the internal organ in the view of Vaiśeṣikas. It is one in each body. It is an immaterial, corporeal, partless, atomic, unconscious eternal substance, which is capable of action. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are perceived by an organ [26]. The external senses are not their organs. So the *manas* is their organ.

Another argument by the Vaiśeṣika is that through the self the sense-organs and the objects are present though the selfperception of external organ is not present. Therefore the existence of manas is inferred from non-production and production of perceptions at particular times[27]. Here, when the *manas* is present there is perception. When it is not there is no perception. The conjunction of the self with the *manas*, of the *manas* with the sense-organ, of the sense-organ with the object are necessary conditions of perception[28].

Recollection of the sense-objects also prove the existence of mind.

Cognitions, volitions and other qualities of the self are always successive but not simultaneous. Their non-simultaneity proves the existence of one *manas* in each body. If there were many internal organs they would be the cause of different kinds of perception simultaneously[29].

The internal organ is atomic. If it were of large magnitude, it would come into conjunction with all sense-organs at the same time and produce perception of all senses simultaneously, but they are not perceived simultaneously at our experience. They are perceived in succession. This non-simultaneity of perceptions proves the atomic size of *manas*. It is ubiquitous, it cannot come into contact with the self. If there is no conjunction of the self with the *manas*, self cannot produce its qualities. Also the *manas* is not of intermediate magnitude. If it is so it would be composed of parts and be non-eternal. So mind is an atomic internal organ which is capable of conjunction with the self. One self has one *manas*, with which it transmigrates from one body to another[30].

Mind is corporeal (*Mūrta*) because it is capable of movement. Though it is corporeal, it is eternal, because it has no parts. It is devoid of any specific quality. It has the generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity. It is intangible. Each *manas* has a particularity which distinguishes it from eternal substances. The genus of *manas* resides in it.

QUALITY (*GUṆA*)

Kaṇāda defines a quality as an existing thing inhering in a substance and devoid of quality, which is not an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction (*dravyāśraya-guṇavān samyogavibhāgeṣvanapekṣa iti guṇalakṣanam*)[31]. Praśastapāda adds one more characteristic of a quality. According to him this is an entity related to the genus of a quality, abiding in a substance and devoid of quality and action[32]. A quality inheres in a substance which is its substrate. But it is not identical with a substance. The quality is devoid of qualities. The quality is devoid of action. Quality and action exist in substance only. A quality has a community. (*Guṇatva jātiman*)

DIFFERENT KINDS OF QUALITIES

Kaṇāda mentions seventeen qualities, viz., colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition. But the commentator, Praśastapāda adds seven more qualities by the word of '*ca*' used by the aphorist, viz, heaviness, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit and sound. Thus there are twenty four qualities.

Qualities are divided into general and special. General qualities are those which abide generally in two or more substances. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, derived fluidity, gravity and velocity are general qualities.

Special qualities are those which abide in one substance only at the same time and not in two or more substances. Colour, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, natural fluidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, faculty and sound are special qualities. Qualities are further divided into three kinds,

(i) those which are perceptible by one external sense organ. e.g., sound, touch, colour, taste and odour.

(ii) qualities those which are perceptible through two external sense-organs, e.g., number magnitude, distinctness, conjuction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity, viscidity and velocity.

(iii) Qualities those which are imperceptible through the external sense-organs. e.g., gravity, merit, demerit, faculty, cognition, pain, desire, aversion and volition.

These are perceptible through the internal organ (*manas*)[33].

Qualities are divided into eternal and non-eternal. The qualities of eternal substances are eternal. The qualities of non-eternal substances are non-eternal.

Colour, taste, odour, touch, remoteness, nearness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity and velocity are qualities of corporeal substances. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition impression merit and demerit are qualities of incorporeal substances. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction are qualities of both corporeal and incorporeal substances.

ACTION (*KARMAN*)

Kaṇāda narrates action as an entity which is inherent in one substance, which is devoid of quality and which is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction (*Ekadravyamaguṇam Samyogavibhāgeṣvanapek ṣakāraṇamiti Karmalakṣaṇam*)[34]. This also resides in a substance to make a quality. But an action is its dynamic and temporary feature whereas a quality is its static and enduring feature. An action, like a quality, resides in the substance and is devoid of a quality. But it is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction, whereas a quality is not their cause. Action has the genus of motion which inheres in it (*Karmatvajātimā*n). It is not eternal and resides in a non-eternal substance. An incorporeal ubiquitous substance like ether, time, space or a soul is incapable of action. Motion is produced by heaviness, fluidity, effort and conjunction.

Five kinds of action are recognised, upward action (*Utṣepaṇam*), downward action (*Apakṣepaṇam*), contraction (*Ākuñjanam*) expansion (*Prasāraṇam*) and locomotion (*Gamanam*)[35].

GENERALITY (*SAMANYA*)

The definition of a generality is that which is eternal and which resides in many things (*Nityam eka: .manekānu-gatam sāmānyam*). It resides in substance, quality and action.

Kaṇāda says community and particularity are not conceptual constructs but ontological entities. Community is the cause of assimilation. It is the notion of common characters among many individuals which are quite different from one another

It is natural and not accidental, e.g., there is the genus of cow (*Gotva*) in many cows, which is one and not different in different individual cows. Generality inheres in all its proper individuals. The genus of cow exists in all individual cows. It does not exist in all individuals- cow, goats, sheep, and the like. There are two divisions in generality, more extensive (*Paratvam*) and less extensive (*Aparatvam*). Generality of earth (*Pṛthivītvam*) is inferiour to the generality of substance (*Dravyatvam*). Being (*Sattā*) is the highest generality. Substances, qualities and actions exist through relation

to Being (*Sattā*). Being is common to them. But it is different from them. Substances, qualities and actions are different from one another. But *Sattā* is identical in them and inheres in them[36].

PARTICULARITY (*VIŚEṢA*)

This is special category accepted by Kaṇāda, by which this philosophy is called 'Vaiśeṣika Philosophy'. Particularities are the differentiating features residing in eternal substances. They reside in eternal substances only and help in distinguishing one from another. They are infinite in number (*Viśeṣāstu anantā eva*)[37]. Particularities are the final distinctive characters of eternal substances. They subsist in the eternal substances- the atoms of earth, water, fire and air, ether, time, space, self and *manas*.[38]

Particularities do not require other particularities to distinguish them from one another because it would lead to infinite regress. They are devoid of community. They had a community that would distinguish their substrates from one another. Eternal substances are infinite in number and their particularities also are innumerable.

INHERENCE (*SAMAVĀYA*)

Inherence is accepted as a sixth category in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. Inherence is the eternal relation which exists in an inseparable pair (*Ayutasiddhavṛtti*). There is a very good definition in *Tarkasangraha* of inseparable pairs: (*Yayordvayormadhye ekamavinaśyadaparāśritamevatiṣtati tāvayuta siddhau*) . When between two things, one thing as long as it is not destroyed, exists in the other things only, they are known as inseparable pairs. e.g., part and whole, quality and the qualified etc. Kaṇāda defines inherence as the relation between a material cause and its effect which is the cause of the notion, this subsists in this abode[39].

Praśastapāda defines *samavāya* (inherence) as the relation which subsists between two inseparable entities related to each other as the substance and content, and is the cause of the notion: This subsists in this abode[40].

Inherence is a relation between substance and quality, a substance and an action, a genus and an individual, an eternal substance and a particularity, a whole and its parts. Inherence is an intimate relation, but it is not an internal relation. It is an eternal relation.

Inherence is one because it has the same distinguishing feature[41]. Inherence is eternal, though its relata are transient. It is not produced by any cause and does not pertain to relation in time. It is different from conjunction which is a temporary relation. Conjunction is a relation between two substances. Inherence is a relation between a substance and another substance or non-substance. Conjunction is a separable relation while inherence is an inseparable relation.

Inherence is a separate category while conjunction is a quality. Inherence is one while conjunctions are many. Inherence is imperceptible while conjunction is perceptible. Conjunction is destroyed by disjunction of its relation, but inherence is indestructible.

Inherence is different from substance, quality, action, community and particularity because it is a relation between a substance and other category. It is different from non-existence. So it is a distinct category.

NON-EXISTENCE (*ABHĀVA*)

Negation is not included in categories, but this nega-

tion is accepted as a category by Kaṇāda and his followers. Udayana divides the categories into existence and non-existence. He divides existence into substance, quality, action, community and particularity and the non existence into, prior-negation (*Prāgabhāva*), posterior negation (*Pradhvaṁsā - bhāva*), absolute negation (*Atyantābhāva*) and mutual non-existence (*Anyonyābhāva*)[42].

Prior negation is without a beginning but with an end (*Anādiḥ Sāntaḥ prāgabhāvaḥ*)[43]. It exists prior to the production of an effect, e.g., A jar is produced from clay. There is prior negation of the jar in clay. It is without a beginning, but has an end. It is destroyed by the production of the effect. When the jar is produced, its prior negation is destroyed. It is beginningless but not eternal.

Posterior negation has a beginning but is without an end. It occurs after the production of an effect (*Sādiranantaḥ pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ*)[44]. It has a beginning but no end. Posterior negation is produced by the destruction of an effect but it can never be destroyed. e.g., when a jar is destroyed it has posterior negation in its fragments, which is produced by an

efficient cause.

Absolute negation exists in all the three times, having that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative delimited by relation or connection (*Traikālika saṁsargāvacchinna pratiyogitākotyantābhāvaḥ*)[45]. There is absolute negation of colour in air, there is absolute negation of genus of earth in water and of the genus of water in earth. Absolute negation does not refer to production or destruction. It does not refer to the past or the future. It is eternal in nature.

The mutual negation is that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative as delimited by the relation of identity (*Tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitako'nyonyābhāvaḥ*)[46] e.g., the non-existence of a horse in a cow and the non existence of a cow in a horse are mutual relation. It is one and eternal, but it is related to different objects when they are produced. Mutual negation has for its counter entities identity between two things.

ATOMIC THEORY OF VAIŚEṢIKAS

The Vaiśeṣika advocates the theory of atomism. Earth, Water, fire and air are eternal as atoms and non-eternal as composite products. They are the invisible units of physical substances. They cannot inter-penetrate one another, for there is no intra-atomic space. They are motionless in themselves. Their motion is due to an eternal agent. The later Vaiśeṣikas said that God produces motion in atoms--combines them into composite products--with the aid of merits and demerits of the individual souls and causes their enjoyments and sufferings[47].

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that a *dvyaṇuka* is produced by the conjunction of two atoms. The motion of the atom is produced by the God. The two atoms are its inherent cause, their conjunction is their non-inherent cause, the merits and demerits of individual souls are its efficient cause. When there is an activity among the diads (*dvyaṇuka*) they come into conjunction with one another and produce a triad (*tryaṇuka*). A *caturaṇuka* is produced by the conjunction of four triads which are active. The qualities of the compos-

ite products are produced by those of the component atoms which are their inherent causes[48].

An atom is eternal because it is a substance which is partless like ether. Atoms are not non-spatial, but they have the minutest magnitude. They are spherical and supersensible. But they can be perceived by yogins and God.

THE MORAL ENDS (*PURUṢĀRTHAS*)

The attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the natural ends of voluntary actions. Of the four human values, Vaiśeṣikas give importance to *dharma* and *mokṣa*. There also *dharma* is the instrumental cause of liberation. We can understand this from the definition of *dharma* given by Kaṇāda, *dharma* is what accomplishes happiness and liberation - (*Yato 'bhyudayaniśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ*)[49].

Here happiness is both worldy happiness and happiness in heaven. Kaṇāda regards happiness as the end of positive actions and the liberation as the end of negative actions.

Liberation is attained when merits due to the performance of duties are destroyed. Only true knowledge of real-

ity can lead to release, but it is aided by the purity of mind brought about by the performance of duties. Spiritual insight is the direct cause of liberation.

Liberation is absolute negation of pain. Sridhara maintains that both knowledge of reality (*tattvajñānam*) and the performance of duties are necessary for Liberation. Liberation is not due to knowledge alone, but to the combination of knowledge with duties. The compulsory daily occasional duties must be performed. The non-performance of them produces sins of omission. The performance of them purifies the mind. Repeated practice of knowledge and obligatory duties lead to release[50].

GOD

Kaṇāda did not mention the supreme soul in the *Vaiśeṣika Sutra*. The famous Aphorism which is repeated twice by him does not clearly refer to God. The Aphorism is "*Tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmāṇyam*"[51]. The authority of Vedas is due to the utterance of him or them. It may mean that the authority of the Vedas is due to the utterance of God or

the seers, who perceive supersensible objects like merit, demerit, heaven, hell and the like. He believes in supernormal perception of the sages born of merit due to austerities and meditation. According to him God is not the efficient cause of the world. This reveals that the early Vaiśeṣika system was atheistic. In the matter of Praśastapāda, he speaks of the sages as the authors of the Vedas, who have supernormal power. He faithfully represents Kaṇāda's view in regard to the authority of the Vedas. But he is theist and accepts that creation and destruction of the world happen at the will of God. Praśastapāda regards God as the efficient cause of the world and atoms as its material cause[52].

The Vaiśeṣika gives another argument for the existence of God. He is the author of the Vedas. The validity of the scriptural testimony is due to the authority of God, who is free from error, inadvertence, deficiency of the sense-organs. He is eternal and omniscient. God is the promulgator of the Moral Law. Whatever is prohibited by him is wrong. The Divine Law is the moral standard.

The cosmological argument proves the existence of

one-God. If there were many Gods, they would be non-omniscient like us and so incapable of producing the world, out of the atoms. If they were omniscient, one of them would be competent to produce the world and the others would become useless. If they were equal to one another, they would have no unity of purpose. If they had the same purpose, one of them would be the sovereign Lord and the others would not be Lords. So God is one.

NOTES

1. VS.I.1.4 SP. P.9.

2. KKV. P.103

3. PBh. P.17,18.

4. VS.I.1.15.

5 VS.VSU.I.1.8.10 & 12.

6. TSG. P.9

7. PBh. P.35-36.

8. TSG. P.9.

9. PBh. P.38,39.

10. TSG. P.9

11. VS.II.1.38, PBh. P.58

12. TBh. P.186

13. TBh.P.186, TSG.P.12.

14. VS.II.ii.12.

15. TSP. P.135.

16. KV P.116

17. KV. P.118

18. PBh.P.63-64

19. VS.II.ii.7

20. PBh. P.63

21. VS.III.1.2.

22. PBh. P.69

23. VSU.III. 1-18, PBh. P.17

24. PBh. P.132-135, KNV.P.132-36.

25. VS, VSU. III.1.19

26. TSG. P.13.

27. VS.II.ii.1, PBh.P.89

28. PBh. P.89

29. VSU. III. ii.1-3, PBh.P.89

30. VSU. III. ii. 1-3.

31. VS.I.1.16

32. PBh.P.94.

33. PBh. P.95-97

34. VS.I.1-17

35. TSG. P.2

36. VS & VSU

37. TSG.P.6

38. TSG.D.P.6, PBh.P.13.

39. TSG.P.6

40. PBh. P.14

41. TSG.P.6

42. NK.P.230

43. TSG P.50

44. TSG.P.50

45. TSG.P.51.

46. TSG.P.20

47. TBh. P.21

48. TSD.P.10.

49. VS.I.1.2.

50. NK.P.283-86

51. VS.I.1.3, X.ii.9

52. PBh. P.7,131.

CHAPTER IV

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY

SUBSTANCES (*DRAVYA*)

A substance (*dravya*) has the characteristic of existence. It possesses generation, destruction, and permanence. Some new qualities are generated, some old qualities are destroyed and some qualities remain permanent in it. Permanence means indestructibility and continuity of the essence of the substances. Recognition apprehends permanence of a substance in the form 'this is that'. When prominence is given to the indestructible essence of a thing and its changing qualities are subordinated to its essence, it is called a substance. It is permanent in regard to its essential qualities, and impermanent in regard to its changing qualities'[1]. A substance is possessed of attributes (*guṇa*) and modes (*Paryāya*). Attributes coexist with one another in the substance. Modes

succeed one another in it. Modes are changes in the attributes of a substance. They are partly different from their substance, for their substance persists even when they are destroyed. They are partly identical with their substance because they cannot exist apart from their substance, and because they are nothing but its modifications[2].

A substance is both permanent and changing. It is permanent as a substance, and change is as modes.

The relation of a substance to its mode is that of matter to its form. There can be neither matter without form nor form without matter.

A substance cannot exist without attributes, which also cannot exist without it. They are partly different from, and partly non-different from each other in their nature.

If a substance is entirely distinct from its attributes, then it may be transformed into infinite other substances. If the attributes are entirely distinct from a substance and can exist apart from it, there is no necessity for a substance. Both the alternatives are untenable. Hence a substance and attributes are not entirely distinct from each other [3].

The Jaina Philosophy brings the whole universe under two everlasting categories. The two classes of things are respectively described as *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, the consciousness and unconsciousness, the latter, *Ajīva*, including not merely matter but also time and space. Therefore, the Jaina recognizes six substances as (1) soul(*Jīva*) (2) the principle of motion (*Dharma*) (3) the principle of rest (*Adharma*) (4) space (*Ākāśa*). (5) matter (*Pudgala*) and (6) time (*Kāla*). The last five substances are called non-soul (*Ajīva*) . The first five substances are extensive like body (*Kāya*), and occupy more than one unit of space: So they are called *astikāyas*. Soul, matter, *dharma, adharma* and space are extensive substances. Time is unextended and composed of innumerable moments which are not coextensive with one another. So time is a substance devoid of extension.

JĪVA

The notion of *Jīva* in general corresponds to that of *Ātman* or *Puruṣa* of the other schools of Indian thought. But as implied by the etymology of its name - " what lives of by animate"- the concept seems to have been arrived at first ob-

serving the characteristic of life and not through the search after a metaphysical principle underlying individual existence[4].

The number of *Jīvas* is infinite all being alike and eternal. In their empirical form they are classified in various ways such as those that have one sense, two senses and so forth. The *Jīva* is an eternal, spiritual substance. It is uncorporeal, immaterial, and different from the body or the sense organs. But it is co-extensive with the body it occupies, as the light of a lamp coextensive with the room in which it exists[5]. The Jainas believe not only that the *Jīva* exists, but also that it acts and is acted upon. It is the knower (*Jñātṛ*), enjoyer (*Bhoktṛ*) and active agent (*Kartṛ*)[6].

Its intrinsic nature is one of perfection and it is characterized by infinite intelligence, infinite peace, infinite faith and infinite power[7].

Cognition, feeling and conation are its qualities. Consciousnes is not its accidental quality, but it constitutes its essence. It is active and free. It can freely do right actions or wrong actions, and acquire merit or demerit. It is the mas-

ter of its own destiny. It freely enters into bondage, and is separated from *karman*-matter in the state of liberation. The liberated soul moves upward to the summit of mundane space. From the practical stand point that is called the soul which is possessed of the five sense-organs and vital forces, strength, duration of life and inspiration and expiration. But from the ontological stand point that is called the soul which has consciousness. The soul is absolutely different from the non-soul. The five sense-organs and the body are its accidental adjuncts which are not conscious[8].

The Jainas accept that *Jīva* is active because of its association with *karman* matter. In the perfect state it is absolutely free from *karmans*, and becomes inactive. In the state of bondage it is the agent of its own actions, and the enjoyer of their fruits. It is blinded by ignorance on account of its bondage to *karman*-matter created by itself and roams about in the world of birth and death. The faithful soul liberates itself from bondage by adopting the path of Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct. But the unfaithful soul roams about in the world of *samsāra* for ever. The destiny of each *Jīva* is entirely self-determined.[9]

The soul is a spiritual substance, and consequently unextended. But it is considered to be an extensive substance because it illuminates the whole body with its consciousness[10].

The souls are of two kinds, bound and liberated. The former are limited by adjuncts and have either gross body or subtle body. The latter are free from bodily adjuncts.

The former are impure, while the latter are pure. The former have false knowledge and perception, emotion and passions, while the latter have omniscience, infinite bliss and infinite power. The omniscient soul pervades the whole universe by its consciousness. Even the bound soul occupies innumerable space-points. Though it occupies innumerable space points, it can occupy the space of a small body or a large body by the contraction and expansion of the space points like a lamp. The perfect souls are absolutely unconditioned. They have no casual relation to the cycle of *samsāra*. They are entirely free from *karman*-matter. But the imperfect souls are united with *karman*-matter.[11]

The *Jīvas* are either embodied or disembodied. The former attain liberation, but the latter never attain liberation

but roam in the world for ever. The embodied souls are of five kinds. Among these human souls are rational; animal souls, plant souls, and elemental souls are irrational[12].

DHARMA

Dharma used in the Jaina metaphysics is not the same concept of other philosophies. *Dharma* is the imperceptible medium of motion. It is supersensible and devoid of sensible qualities, taste, colour, smell, sound, touch, lightness, and heaviness. It is perceptible to the omniscient soul only. It is incorporeal, inactive, and eternal. It is co-extensive with mundane space. It is continuous because its units of space are inseparable. It is without any gaps and motionless. It cannot impel matter and souls to move. When they begin to move, it assists their movement. *Dharma* is the neutral, external, auxiliary cause of motion of matter and living beings which move on account of their own material causes. It pervades mundane space. So it is called *dharmāstikāya*. It is a real substance which persists in the midst of changing modes[13].

ADHARMA

Adharma is the principle of rest. *Adharma* is one, eternal, formless, inactive substance which is co-extensive with worldly space. So it is called *adharmāstikāya*. It is an extensive substance. It is non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. It is simple, incorporeal and formless. Its structure is not constituted by space points. It is devoid of sensible qualities of material things. It is imperceptible to us but perceptible to the omniscient soul. It is an eternal, neutral, auxiliary cause of rest of moving and stationary living beings and material things. It is not the principal cause of rest of living beings and non-living things. It does not generate their rest,nor does it impel them to rest. *Adharma* merely helps the rest of stationary and moving things without which they would not be able to rest. It is the support of rest [14].

The Jainas recognize the reality of nine varieties, viz. (1) soul (*Jīva*), (2) non-soul(*Ajīva*), (3) merit(*Puṇya*), (4) demerit (*Pāpa*), (5) inflow (*Āsrava*), (6) bondage (*Bandha*), (7) stoppage (*Samvara*), (8) shedding of *karma*n (*Nirjara*) and (9) liberation (*Mokṣa*). *Jīva* is a living

being or soul. Matter, *dharma, adharma*, space, and time constitute non-soul (*Ajīva*). *Punya* is virtue or merit, *pāpa* is vice or demerit. *Āsrava* is the inflow of *karman* matter into the soul. *Bandha* is bondage or investment of the soul by *karman*-matter. *Samvara* is the arrest of the *karman*-matter into the soul. *Nirjara* is partial destruction of the accumulated *karman*-matter. *Mokṣa* is complete destruction of the accumulated *karman*-matter and liberation of the soul from bondage. Of these nine categories, *Jīva and ajīva* are the primary. Existence merit, demerit, *āsrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara* and *mokṣa* are the conditions of the soul which arise from its different relations to *karman*-matter[15].

MOKṢA

Liberation is the absolute separation of the soul from all karmic-matter which has entered into the soul. The destruction of all accumulated karmic matter leads to the self's realization of its instrinsic purity. Right faith, right knowledge and right conduct (3gems) constitute the path to liberation. When karmic matter is burnt by these three gems of the

Jaina philosophy, it does not cause birth and death, even as scorched seeds do not germinate[16]. First deluding *karmans*, which are the causes of *samsāra*, are entirely destroyed by right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, when the influx of a new *karman*-matter is stopped, and the accumulated *karman*-matter is worn out. Then obstructive knowledge obscuring and faith obscuring *karmans* are simultaneously destroyed. Lord-ship appears in the soul separated from the four kinds of *karman*-matter. The person is called the supreme Lord. He becomes pure, enlightened, free from bodily and mental diseases, and omniscient. He is called the victor (*Jina*). He attains *nirvāṇa* when the other four kinds of *karmans*, feeling-obscuring, age-determining, character-determining and family-determining are completely destroyed. The liberated soul moves upward to the summit of mundane space[17]. It realizes infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power.

JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE (*ĀKĀŚA*) AND TIME (*KĀLA*)

Regarding primary material elements (*Mahābhūtas*) there are two old views. One view recognized five *mahābhūtas* and the other recognized four *mahābhūtas*.

The five *mahābhūtas* recognized by the first view were *ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap* and *Pṛthvī*. They possessed the five special qualities- *ākāśa-śabda, vāyu-sparśa, tejas-rūpa, ap-rasa* and *pṛthvī-gandha*. Those who followed this view counted *ākāśa* as a *mahābhūta* with a special quality *śabda*. The sāṅkhya-yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā accepted this view. The four *mahābhūtas* recognized by the other old view were *vāyu, tejas, ap* and *pṛthvi*. Those who followed this view maintained either that *ākāśa* is a form of matter produced from the four *mahābhūtas* or that *ākāśa* is non-material, non-spiritual substance. The Therāvādi Buddhists accepted the first alternative. For them *ākāśa* is *saṁskṛta*, it is produced from the four *mahābhūtas*, thus it is a derived matter (*Upādāya rupa*). But the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists, who too recognized the above-mentioned four

mahābhūtas only raised ākāśa to the status of *asaṁskṛta* (eternal) *dharma* (element), thus putting at state its *bhautikatva* (materiality). So for them *ākāśa* is a non-material, non-spiritual (rather non-physical) element. Jainas too follow this old tradition of four *mahābhūtas* and maintain that *akasa* is not *pudgala* (matter) but is an independent substance.

JAINA DESCRIPTION OF *ĀKĀŚA*

Jainas do not regard *ākāśa* as a mode or an effect of *mahābhūtas*[18]. For them it is an independent fundamental substance. It is devoid of colour, odour, taste and touch. According to Jainas *śabda* is a mode of *mahābhūtas* or matter (*Pudgala*)[19]. Aggregates (*Skandhas*) of atoms strike against one another and *śabda* is produced from them. Hence *śabda* is not the nature of *ākāśa*, nor is it its quality. If *śabda* were its quality the quality of *ākāśa* being formless or non-physical it would not have been heard through the organ of hearing, say the Jainas. *Ākāśa* is infinite in extent, it is present every-

where, it stretches not only over the universe, but also far beyond over the non-universe. All other substances are confined to the universe only. Thus no substance is so extensive as *ākāśa* is. The pervasiveness of *ākāśa* is infinite. *Ākāśa* is one in number[20]. It is a one membered class, so to say. There is no possibility of increase or decrease in its number. It is one and will ramain one for ever. It is eternal in the sense that it never gives up its nature. As it is present everywhere in the universe, the possibility of movement from one place to another is rejected in its case.

The function of *ākāśa* is to afford room to other substances[21]. Other substances exist by their own nature. There is no doubt about it. But they require something to exist in. They do exist by themselves. But where in do they exist ? They exist in *ākāśa*. Their existence is not the same as *ākāśa*. Nor is *ākāśa* an aspect of them. It is a fundamental substance different from them. Thus *ākāśa* is a universal container in which all other substances are contained.

Can *ākāśa* function as a condition of motion ? The Jaina answer to this question is an emphatic 'no'. They con-

tend that if it be also the condition of motion, then wherever there is *ākāśa*, there whould be a chance of motion, but neither a single *Jīva*, nor a single body nor a single atom could step beyond the limit of universe (*Loka*) though there is *ākāśa* beyond the universe. If *ākāśa* were credited with the function of assisting motion then it being present in *aloka* (non-universe) also the division of *loka* and *aloka* would disappear, the *loka* (universe) would dissipate, the atoms would disperse in the infinite space, they would be very far from one another and they would hardly come in contact with one another to form material bodies[22].

UNITS OF SPACE (*ĀKĀŚA PRADEŚAS*)

A primary indivisible atom of matter is the ultimate unit of matter. And the space occupied by a material atom is the ultimate unit of space. It is called *Pradeśa* (Spacepoint)[23]

Though *ākāśa* does never accomodate two material bodies in the same spacepoint at a time, it, under certain conditions, can accomodate upto *ananta* material atoms in one

and the same space point at a time. This phenomenon becomes possible because material atoms in their subtle stages are conceived as mutually non-obstructive[24]. Again, this phenomenon definitely proves the fact that a material atom is subtler than a spacepoint.

Ākāśa has *ananta* spacepoints. But this number *ananta* is fixed in the sense that there is no possibility of increase or decrease of even a single spacepoint.

. The spacepoints are conceived as inseparable parts or *avayavas* of *ākāśa*. Thus *ākāśa* is an *avayavi-astikāya*. *Avayavas* or parts (*pradeśas*) of *ākāśa* are as much objectively existent as *ākāśa* of which they are parts. They maintain that the partless *ākāśa* can never be a favourable receptacle for the objects having parts. Thus they contend that *ākāśa* too must have parts, for when the table exists in space as in that case, other things cannot exist at all anywhere. The table exists not in all space but in that part of space where it does actually exist, leaving room for the other objects to exist elsewhere. All this clearly implies that space too has parts, space is an *avayavin*. To be an *avayavin* does not necessarily mean

that it should be produced from its *avayavas* put together at some point of time.

DIVISION OF *ĀKĀŚA*

Ākāśa is *ananta* (infinite) in extension. That portion of it which contains all substances is called *lokākāśa* (universe space) and that portion of *ākāśa* which has no substance to accomodate in itself is called *alokākāśa* (space beyond the universe). *Ākāśa* is one only. *Lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa* are not two individual *ākāśas*. Thus this division is not in *ākāśa* itself but it is due to its relation with other substances[25].

TIME SUBSTANCE ACCORDING TO DIGAMBARAS

According to the Diagambara thinkers, time is atomic. There are innumerable time atoms. Each time atom occupies one spacepoint of the cosmic space. Thus time atoms are confined to cosmic space only. They are not present in the space beyond cosmos[26]. They do not combine to form molecules as the material atoms do. Nor they constitute one single

whole as the spacepoints do. Thus they have no spatial extension (*tiryak pracaya*). Only those substances that have spatial extension are termed "*astikāya*". Hence time is not counted among *astikāyas*. Time atoms go on assuming different modes all the while. All these modes are not measurable. The smallest measurable mode of a time-atom is termed *samaya* (instant) which is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse a unit of space by slow movement[27]. Each time has infinite such modes. Though these modes are not simultaneous, a time atom being a substance pervades all of them, i.e. these modes are not discrete without any permanent substance underlying them. This is the reason why time atoms are said to have temporal extension. Time atoms are motionless and hence each of them for ever occupies one particular spacepoint in cosmic space. They are immobile entities arranged in close proximity to one another. They are eternal as they are atomic and do not form aggregates. Origination, persistence and decay in their case are explained through the origination, persistence and decay of other things (*Parapratyayotpāda vināśasadbhāvādanityaḥ*)[28]. It is also

said that they are eternal in the sense that they never give up their own nature and that the origination and decay in their case is due to the rhythmic rise and fall of their untranslatable term. literally means neither heavy nor light quality. Acārya Kundakunda maintains that a time atom undergoes origination, persistence and decay at one and the same movement.

Time atoms are devoid of physical qualities like colour etc., and in this sense only they are called *amūrta*.

PUDGALA (MATTER)

Pudgala (Matter) is a non-soul substance which has touch, taste, smell, and colour. Material substances have form. Matter exists in the form of an atom or an aggregate. Atoms are indivisible units of matter. Aggregates are composed of atoms. Atoms arise from the division of aggregates. They are the furthest limit of division. They cannot arise from combination. An atom is one indivisible, indestructible and corporeal unit of matter. It is the maker and breaker of aggregates. It is spatial, yet non-spatial. It occupies only one unit of space. It is the determinant of time and number. It is with-

out beginning, middle and end. It is capable of modifications. Atoms are combined into aggregates. The aggregates are minute or large, and have touch, taste, smell, colour and sound. But atoms each have one taste, one smell, one colour and two tactible qualities. They are the causes of sounds, but devoid of sounds.

There are five kinds of colour blue, yellow, white, black, and red. There are eight kinds of touch - softness, hardness, lightness, heaviness, coldness, heat, smoothness and roughness.

Atoms have imperceptible qualities. They become perceptible in the aggregates. Of the eight kinds of tactile qualities an atom has temperature. It has neither heaviness nor lightness. An atom occupies only one space point. So atom cannot have sound. Sound is not the quality of ether. It would be heard in a vaccum in which ether is present[29].

Atoms are homogeneous and devoid of qualitative differences. Atoms are subtle and imperceptible to us, but they can be perceived by the Omniscient only. The homogeneous atoms produce the four elements of earth, water, fire and air[30].

One moment is the time taken by an atom to move from one space - point is the next space point. The change of position of an atom is the measure of time. One atom of matter and one particle of time exist in one unit of space. Matter, time and space are three inseparable units of the physical world. They cannot be separated from one another, though they are different in their nature. Matter, space, time units are the elementary substances of the dynamic world. *Karman* particles are infra-atomic matter. They are finer than atoms[31].

Aggregates have manifest qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound. They have atomic linking, dimension, figure, divisibility, opacity and radiant heat (light).

PRAMĀṆAS

In any school of Indian Philosophy pramāṇas have crucial role to acquire knowledge. In the Jaina Philosophy also there is a vast inquiry about pramanas. *Pramāna* is the definitive cognition of the self and others (*Svaparavyavasāyijñānam pramāṇam*). In Jaina view the *pramāṇa* can also be defined as " a valid knowledge about the self and the not self".

By defining the *pramāṇa* as valid knowledge, the Jaina means to show also that it is to be distinguished from doubt, illusion and inattention.

The Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* can stand the test of valid syllogism. It is in this way. "The *pramāṇa* is valid knowledge, regarding the self and the not self" because *pramāṇa*-hood cannot be met with otherwise (i.e.because *pramāṇa*-hood and valid knowledge regarding the self and the not self are invariably found together). Vādi Devasūri defines valid knowledge as determinate cognition which apprehends itself and an object, and which is capable of prompting activity which attains a desirable object or rejects an undesirable object". Siddhasena defines valid knowledge as cognition, which apprehends itself and an object, and which is not contradicted. These definitions do not exclude recollection from valid knowledge[32].

The result of valid knowledge is cessation of ignorance, avoidance of evil, selection of good, and indifference. It is partly distinct and partly non-distinct from valid knowledge. The person who has valid knowledge removes his ignorance,

avoids evil, selects good and becomes indifferent on account of the knowledge of truth.

A cognition in itself is valid since it cannot contradict itself. It is valid or invalid in relation to its object. If it is not in harmony with its object, it is invalid[33]. The validity (*Prāmāṇya*) of knowledge consists in its agreement with its object and the invalidity (*Aprāmāṇya*) of knowledge consists in its disagreement with its object. Both validity and invalidity of knowledge arise from extraneous circumstances, viz., the proficiency or dificiency respectively in their causes. But they are known from extraneous circumstances, viz, the knowledge of harmony and disharmony and the presence or absence of contradictory experience in unhabitual cognitions. Valid knowledge is of two kinds, immediate knowledge or perception-(*Pratyakṣa*)and mediate or indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa*).

In other words, according to Jaina Philosophy, *Pramāṇa* (cognition) is of two kinds:- (1)Perception and (2) non-perception.

(1) PERCEPTION

Perception is that which is an effect depends on the sense which is called '*akṣa*' (*Akṣam indriyam pratigatam kāryatvenāsritam pratyakṣam*). Perception is distinct knowledge[34]. Distinctness consists in the apprehension of an object with its specific qualities without the mediation of any other knowledge. It is independent of other pramāṇas. It is stronger than indirect knowledge as a kind of valid knowledge

(2) NON- PERCEPTION

It is clear in itself. Which is hidden from sense (*Akṣebhyo akṣādvā parato vartate iti parokṣam*) is non perceptual.

There are two kinds of perception empirical and transcendental.

(1) Empirical

(*Samīcīno bādhārahito vyavahāraḥ pratinivṛttiḥ lokābhilāpalakṣaṇaḥ saṁvyavahāraḥ, saṁvyavahārah tatprayojanam saṁvyavahārikam*). Our ordinary perception

is empirical. It is based on unhindered transaction (*Samvyavahāra*), characterised by corresponding talk of engagements and withdrawals, e.g., perceptual cognition of ourselves. It depends on the sense-organs and other conditions[35].

Transcendental perception depends upon proximity to the self, and not upon the sense organs and other conditions. It is revelation of knowledge of all objects due to the extirpation of the *karman* matter that enters into the soul.

Again empirical perceptual cognition is of two kinds (a) Sensuous and (b) Quasisensuous.

The sensuous is effected by eyes etc. (*cakṣurādi-janitam*) and the Quasi sensuous is born in mind. Though mind functions even in the sensuous cognition, it is the extra -ordinary cause. Non-sensuous perception apprehends pleasure, pain, cognition and volition through *manas* which is not a sense-organ.

Both of these again are of two kinds (i) Sensuous cognition and (ii) Scriptural knowledge.

SENSUOUS COGNITION

Sensuous cognition is conditioned by a sense and the mind, and is not based on word, whereas that which is based on word, is scriptural knowledge (pitcher is pitcher). Sense-cognition has four stages

(i) *Avagraha* (grasp)

(ii) *Īhā* (speculation)

(iii) *Avāya* (perceptual, determination)

(iv) *Dhāraṇa* (retention).

(i) *AVAGRAHA*

Avagraha is of two kinds (a) contact awareness and (b) object awareness. Contact awareness is of four kinds in accordance with the difference of senses except sight and mind, which being of non-contactory nature cannot have any contact awareness. Otherwise, there should have been wetness and burning at the sight and the thought of water and fire. (b) Object awareness:- It is the general feature, without any distinction of form , name genus, activity, quality and substances (*Svarūpa-nāma-jāti- kriyā guṇa-dravyakalpanā*

rahitam sāmānya grahaṇam arthāvagrahaḥ) It is the first impression of an object endowed with inferior generic characters arising from the formless cognition of mere beinghood just after the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object.

(ii) *ĪHĀ* (SPECULATION-ATTENTION)

It is the soul which is able to appreciate the qualities of the visible object. For example, on hearing noise, one does not in the beginning know whose noise it is. This is the stage of *avagītā*. Speculation comes when one feels the curiosity of knowing the source from which the noise is coming forth[36].

(iii) *AVĀYA* (PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENT, DETERMINATION)

In it one comes to know about the object definitely. To pursue the above mentioned, example, one enters the stage of *avāya* when one is able to locate the source of the noise definitely.

(iv) *DHĀRAṆA* (RETENTION)

This stage comes when the full knowledge about the object leaves an impression (*Saṁskāra*) upon the heart (*Antaḥkaraṇa*) of the man. This is the final stage of direct knowledge. Recollection, perception and inference are all included in this stage.

SCRIPTURAL KNOWLEDGE

Śruta knowledge is derived through words. It is produced by the word which is heard. It is to be gained from authoritative books and words of great sages. Perusal of authoritative books and listening to the sermons of saints are essential for this kind of knowledge. Knowledge through the sense-organ is, thus, a prerequisite for *śruta* knowledge. *Mati* knowledge precedes *śruta* knowledge. The preaching of the Tirthankaras fall in the latter category.

Sruta knowledge is divided into two categories, viz, (i)*Aṅgapraviṣta* and (ii)*Aṅgabāhya*. The former is mentioned in Jaina scriptures, while the *śruta* knowledge outside

the pale of religious books of the Jaina falls in the latter category. *Aṅgapraviṣta* is regarded superior to *Aṅgabāhya.*

TRANSCENDENTAL PERCEPTION

Trnascendental (*Pāramārthika*) is direct knowledge for its genesis depends only on the activity of the soul. It can be divided into two subdivisions, viz, (i) *Vikala jñāna* and (ii) *Kevala jñāna.*

KEVALAJÑĀNA

That which has a direct cognition of all substances with modes is called Pure knowledge (*Nikhiladravyaparyāya sākṣātkāri kevalajñānam*). There fore it is called perfect perception.

VIKALAJÑĀNA

It has been divided into two heads namely (1) *Avadhi* (clairvoyance) and (2) *Manaḥ paryāya* (telepathy)

AVADHI (CLAIRVOYANCE)

Having all these objects which have forms as its subjects and depending only on self is the clairvoyance type of knowledge. (*Sakalarūpidravya viṣayaka jātīyam ātmamātrāpekṣam jñānamavadhijñānam*)

MANAḤ PARYĀYAJÑĀNA (TELEPATHY)

It is telepathic knowledge of the processes of other minds. It is direct or immediate knowledge caused by the destruction of a particular kind of *karman*-matter obscuring the knowledge, which is due to the purity of restraint or Right conduct.

NON-PERPECTUAL (MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE)

The indirect is not clear (*Aspaṣṭam parokṣam*). It is wanting in 'clearness'. It is of five kinds, viz., Recollection, Recognition, Reasoning, Inference and Verbal Testimony. Following is the short description of each one of them.

RECOLLECTION

Recollection is the cognition generated only by experience (*Anubhavamātra janyam jñānam smaraṇam*) as that is the image of the Tirthankara (Lord) (*Tattīrthakarabimbamitiyathā*). This is not organ of knowledge. Recollection determines the real nature of an object perceived in the past. So it is valid knowledge.

RECOGNITION

It is the synthetic knowledge, caused by experience and recollection and cognising the similarity between the two and the identity of one person at different ages etc. e.g., This body of the cow is the same[37].

REASONING

Reasoning (*Tarka*) which is knowledge of the invariable concomitance (*Vyāpti*) of the middle term with the major term in the past, the present, and the future, arises from the observation of their co-presence and co-absence. *Vyāpti* is of two kinds: *Anvayavyāpti* and *vyatireka vyāpti*. For

example, 'where there is a smoke, there is a fire'. This is *anvayavyāpti*. 'Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke'. This is *vyatirekavyāpti*[38].

INFERENCE (*ANUMĀNA*)

Inference is the knowledge of probandum from probans. It is based on *Vyāpti* derived from reasoning. There are two kinds of inference, inference for oneself (*Svārtha*) and inference for others (*Parārthā*). The inference of one-self is the probandum caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the probans e.g., the knowledge that 'the mountain contains fire' arising in a person who has perceived the smoke and has also recollected the concomitance. The knowledge of the probans and recollection of the relationship should be jointly accepted as the cause, otherwise there would be an occasion for occurrence of inference with reference to a person who has forgotten or not grasped the relationship and has not perceived the probans. *Parārthānumāna* is used for convincing others. So it must be more systematized and vivid. It is five-fold. In five fold

parārthānumāna an inference is drawn in five sentences. These are called the propositions of inference: e.g.,

(1) *Pratijñā*	-	the hill is fiery.
(2) *Hetu*	-	becuase it is smoking
(3) *Dṛṣṭānta*	-	wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen
(4) *Upanaya*	-	The smoke, which does not exist without fire is in the hill.
(5) *Nigamana*	-	There fore the hill is fiery

ĀGAMA (TESTIMONY)

It is the knowledge of a thing through the words of reliable people. A person, who knows things in their true form and expresses his views correctly is reliable or *āpta*. He is free from prejudice. His words carry the truth which they are seeking to express. *Āgama* is of two kinds, viz., mundane (*Laukika*) and supra mundane(*Alaukika*). The words of Janaka, etc., are *laukika*. The words of the Tīrthaṅkara are *alaukika*. The Jaina do not believe in the Vedas. They have faith only in

the Tīrthaṅkaras, who have attained perfection and realized all knowledge. Just as a lamp illuminates a thing, so word also manifests a thing by its inherent power. But its meaning also depends upon customs and traditions. Its truth or falsehood is determined by the vitue of voice of the speaker[39].

THREE KINDS OF THE FALSE KNOWLEDGE

Some Jaina Philosophers believe in eight kinds of knowledge which can be classified as authentic and fallacious. *Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manaḥparyāya* and *Kevala* are regarded as true authentic knowledge. On the other hand, fallacious knowledge (*Mithyājñāna*) includes *samśaya, viparyaya* and *Anadhyavasāya*. The first five of these have already been discussed. *Samśaya* is that knowledge which admits doubt, suspicion and misgiving. It has its effects upon *Mati* and *Śruta* knowledge. Knowledge which is contrary to truth is dubbed as *Viparyaya*. It is found in *Avadhi*. False knowledge due to negligence or indifference, is known as *Anadhyavasāya*. According to the Jaina, perfect knowledge suffers from no loopholes what so ever. It is sigularly free from *samśaya, vimoha*

and *vibhrama*. Delusion, deception or suspicion cannot assail it.

JAINA THEORY OF SOUND (*ŚABDA*)

The Indian Philosophical schools which have invented, developed and adopted the theory of sound by their speculations may be placed in five groups. The first group is represented by the Sāṅkhyayoga, the second one by the Vaibhāsika school of Buddhists, the third one by the Nyāya. Vaiśeṣika, the fourth one by the Mīmāmsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school and the fifth one by the Jainas.

According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga [40], *Śabda* (sound) is *tanmātra* (infra atomic and potential energy) which generates *ākāśa* (ether or space) because of being a radicle or centre encircled by masses (*Bhūtādi*), while the Vaibhāṣika school[41] of Buddhism maintains that *śabda* (sound) as an object of hearing is one of the fifteen kinds of *Rūpa* (matter). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[42] conceives *śabda* as quality of *ākāśa* (space).

The Mīmāmsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school[43] accept *śabda* as a substance on the basis of the fact that it is perceived independently and directly, it exists as a self-subsistent real and it does not have the criterion of quality of being perceived invariably as dependent upon a substance-substratum[44].

JAINA THEORY OF SOUND


According to Jaina metaphysics, sound is conceived as the manifestation of matter. This view is identical with that of the physical sciences on the theory of sound, as it is conceived by them as energy of matter, i.e.,manifestation of it. It usually orginates in vibrating bodies through the surrounding elastic medium, usually air, as wave motion of the longitudinal type. When the compressional sound waves are passing through air the amplitude of the vibratory motion of the layers or particles is surprisingly small, being only about 10-8cm for a sound that is barely audible.

KINDS OF SOUND:-

According to Jaina Philosophy, there are stated to be

mainly two kinds of sound, viz.,*bhāṣātmaka* (sound incorporated in speech or language). The former is subdivided into two groups, viz., *akṣarātmaka* (articulate utterance or speech) and *anakṣarātmaka* (sound made by creatures, etc. While the latter is also of two groups, viz.,*prāyogika* (sound produced by human beings through the play of musical instruments i.e,musical sound) and *vaiśraśika* (natural sounds such as roaring of thunder, the rippling of water, noises in general etc.) *Prāyogika śabda* (artificial or produced sound) is further subdivided into four kinds, viz., *tata* (musical sound of tabla etc, i.e., a stretched membrane) *Vitata* (musical sound produced by stringed instruments), *ghana* (musical sound produced by solid instruments, such as, bell) and *suṣira* (sound produced by wind instruments, organ pipes or conch)

The outlines of the Jaina sound theory clearly reveal its scientific approach to the problem from the points of view of substantiality and modality in the light of the sound theories of other Indian Philosophies even in the absence of critical data of modern experimental science.



THE DOCTRINE OF *NAYA*

This doctrine is a peculiar feature of Jaina Epistemology. *Pramāṇa* and *Naya* are the different ways of the knowing of the reality[45]. *Pramāṇa* is the valid knowledge of multiform object endowed with many qualities. *Naya* is valid knowledge of one part, aspect, quality or mode of a multiform object. *Naya* is a part of a *pramána*. It is a partial valid knowledge. A *Naya* apprehends a part of a real thing comprehended by valid knowledge, and ignores its other parts. It is the standpoint of the knowing person embodying a particular purpose to understand a particular part of a thing to the exclusion of the other parts. He becomes indifferent to the other aspects of the thing for the time being. *Nayas* are the points of view from which things are considered.

Since *Naya* deals with a part of the object it yields certain knowledge about part of an object and as such it is neither, *pramāṇa* (which is knowledge of an object in its entirety) nor a mode of a false knowledge. *Nayas* are mainly of two kinds, *Dravya Naya* and *Paryāya Naya*. In another classification there are two kinds of *Nayas*.

(i) The expounded (*Vyāsa*) and

(ii) The compounded (*Samāsa*)

EXPOUNDED *NAYA*

In its expounded form it is of many sorts. A thing has infinite aspects and each observer fixes his attention on any one of these aspects in accordance with his purpose or inclination. *Naya* which is concerned with the particular aspect of a thing corresponding to the particular standpoint of the observer is accordingly of many sorts in its expounded form.

COMPOUNDED *NAYA*:-

In its compounded form it is of two kinds:-

(i) *Dravyārthika* and

(ii) *Paryāyarthika*

DRAVYĀRTHIKA NAYA

Dravyārthika Naya considers a thing as a substance in which qualities and modes are unified. It emphasizes the substantial aspect of a thing and ignores its qualitative and model aspect.

Dravya Nayas are of three kinds, *Naigama Naya, Saṅgraha Naya* and *Vyavahāra Naya*. They are also called *Artha Nayas*.

(1) THE NAIGAMA *NAYA*

This *Naya* is the first kind of *Dravyārthika Naya*. This is interpreted in two ways. It signifies in an undistinguished way two ideas, one of which is the chief and the other, an adjunct to it[46].

The Jaina holds that a thing is an organic unity of both generic and specific qualities, which are equally real. This is the concrete view of Jaina. The *Naigama Naya* is the standpoint of the *Nyāya* and the Vaiśeṣika systems according to the Jaina. They hold that a thing is the complex of the universal and the particular, which are equally real and primary and different from each other. So far they agree with the Jaina. But they consider the distinction between the universal and the particular to be absolute, while the Jaina considers it to be relative. They consider them to be absolutely different from each other, while the Jaina considers them to be particularly

different from each other. The *Naigama Naya* becomes *Naigamābhāsa* at the hands of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiseṣikas.

It is of three kinds inasmuch as the ideas may be :-

(i) Ideas of characteristic features or attributes[47].

(ii) Ideas of a substance and of an attribute characteristic or feature (*Vastuparyāyavad dravyamitidharmiṇoḥ*)[48].

(iii) Ideas of substance (*Kṣanamekam sukhī - viṣayāsakta jīvetitu dharmādharmiṇoḥ*)[49].

(2) *SANGRAHA NAYA (SĀMĀNYAMĀTRAGRĀHI PARĀMARŚAḤ SAMGRAHAḤ)*

Literally *Saṅgraha* means the view point which considers the infinite particularities as one identical aggregated whole, i.e., in a homogeneous lump as it were. This *Naya* refers to mere generality devoid of all specific qualities. This *Naya* consists in reconciling the particular aspects of individual things to their underlying common features, and treating the former as a unity. When we have the sangraha, we fix

upon the generalities, eg., Existence, Substantiality, etc.,the generalities as devoid of the infinite particularities characterising the things.

Saṅgraha Naya has been divided into two :-

(i) Ultimate Naya or *Parasaṅgraha*

(ii) Non-ultimate *Naya or Aparasaṅgraha*[50].

(i) ULTIMATE *NAYA*

The Ultimate or the *Parasangraha* consists in assuming an attitude of indifference to the infinite particularities (of a thing) and fixing solely upon (its) barest substratum which is equal to pure existence. The following is the example of ultimate *Naya*: *Viśvamekam sadaviśeṣāditi.*

The Universe is one: for here is no difference in the being (of all things). Everything is cognized to be existent in this respect, i.e.from the consideration of the fact of existence, the infinite number of objects may be said to be but one.

The fallacy in regard to this (i.e.the *saṅgraha naya*) consists in maintaining the absolute identity of all beings and

denying all the particularities. As for instance, pure existence is the only reality: for particularities apart from that are not apprehended [51].

(ii) NON ULTIMATE

The non-ultimate *saṅgraha* consists in taking into consideration such non-ultimate generalities as substantiality etc, and assuming an attitude of indifference to their various modes. For instance, Principles of motion and Rest (*Dharma and Adharma*), Space, Matter, Soul all these substances are one because all of them have substantiality which is identical and so on[52].

(3) *VYAVAHARA NAYA*

The *Vyavahāra Naya* is the practical point of view based on sense-perception. This considers the particular individuals alone, without taking cognizance of their generic qualities and specific qualities.

The fallacy with regard to this practical *naya* consists of a tendency to divide the substances and the modes into un-

real sub-classes. The Cārvāka philosophy is an instance for it. The Cārvākas recognize the reality of the elements of earth, water, fire and air which are objects of practical use and reject the reality of the soul. Their Materialism is *Vyavahāranayābhāsa*[53].

II. *PARYĀYĀRTHIKA NAYA*

Paryāya Naya considers a thing as a conglomeration of qualities and modes and ignores its substantial aspect. *Paryāyārthika Naya* keeps in view the modifications and conditions of the object concerned. This *Naya* is of four kinds.

(a) *Ṛjusūtranaya* (straightly expressed)

(b) Verbal or *śabda naya*

(c) The subtle or *samabhirūḍha naya*

(d) *Evambhūta* or the such like.

(a) *ṚJUSŪTRA NAYA* (STRAIGHTLY EXPRESSED)

This *Naya* consists in a tendency to fix on or emphasise only the mode which is straight, i.e., existent for the present. *Ṛju* means straight, i.e, clearly manifest. The aspect of a thing as it is observed at the present moment is always clear. The

aspect of the thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future cannot appear to be so clear. Although the subject matter of the straight expressed is still a *Dravya* it holds the impermanent modes and aspect as matters of principal interest. For instance, now there is pleasure [54].

(b) VERBAL OR *SABDA NAYA*

Śabda Naya refers to words and their meanings. This *Naya* attributes different meaning to a word in accordance with the difference in tense etc. This *Naya* shows how the meanings of the words vary in accordance with the difference in tense, cases, genders, numbers, persons, prifixes etc. For example *Dā rāh* (plural), *Kalatra* (Singular) mean the same object--wife[55].

(c) THE SUBTLE OR *SAMABHIRUDHA NAYA*

It consists in attributing different meanings to synonyms according to their derivations. For instance *Indra* is one who rains, '*Sakra* is one who is potent, *Purandara* means destroyer of the enemies. This *Naya* emphasizes the literal meanings of the words, and ignores their identical derivative

meaning. This is a special application of '*śabda naya*[56]'.

(d) *EVAMBHŪTA* OR THE SUCH LIKE

Evambhūta Naya is a special application of *Samabhirūḍha naya*. It restricts a word to one particular meaning which emphasizes one particular aspect of an effect suggested by its root. The word '*gauḥ*' literally means a moving animal. A moving cow is a *gauḥ*. When it is at rest, it should not be called a *gaugḥ*. It should be designated by a different word. This is the stand point of *Evambhūtanaya*.

To sum up, a *Naya* a statement also in its application to its object, follows the law of sevenfold predication, through affirmation and negation. The *Naya* considers an object in its particular aspects and part, where as the *pramāṇa* considers an object in its entirety. This is the difference between *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*. *Nayas* are relative truths and not absolute truths. All affirmations and negations are relative to time, place and circumstances. They are not unconditional and absolute. So the doctrine of *Nayas* is related to '*Anekāntavāda*' and '*syādvāda*'.

SYĀDVĀDA

It is the conception of reality as extremely indeterminate in its nature that is the basis of what is known as *syādvāda* - the most conspicuous doctrine of Jainism.

The word '*syāt*' is derived from the *sanskrit* root "as" "to be", being its form in the potential mood. It means 'may be'. So *Syādvāda* may be rendered in English as the doctrine of 'may be'.

Syādvāda signifies that the universe can be looked at from many points of view, and that each view point yields a different approach. The nature of reality is expressed completely by none of them, it admits all predicates. Every proposition is therefore, in strictness, only conditional[57]. Following is the short description of the seven fold theory or the *sapta bhaṅgi*

SAPTABHAṄGI

According to the principle of the Jaina Philosophy, a thing is not confined to one aspect only, but has many aspects (*Anekānta*). Thus in some sense, it is existent, in some sense,

again, it is non-existent. Similarly, viewed from one standpoint, a thing is eternal but viewed from another, it is impermanent. As a matter of fact, seven such aspects may be found out in a thing from seven view points (*Saptabhi- prakāraḥ*). Now word is but a counter-part of the thing and like those in the thing, a word also has seven aspects, so far as its manners of expressing it are concerned.

The predicate consists in using seven sorts of expressions regarding one and the same thing with reference to its particular aspects, one by one without any inconsistency, by means of affirmation and negation, made either separately, or together, all these seven expressions being marked with in some respects' (*Syāt*)[58].

(1) The first predication consists in such affirmative statement, e.g., "Perhaps is" (*Syādastyeva vaktavyam*). The word 'in some respect', thus gives a definite content and character to the thing under consideration and prevents it from having the content and character of other things and thereby losing its own definite and determinate self. The '*Bhaṅga*' indicates the definite and determinate nature of the thing; with-

out this predication the definite nature of the thing would not be stated at all, without this it should be as good as no statement at all. The word in some respect indicates in what definite way and manner the pitcher exists, these words state that the pitcher exists with respect to its own substance and not with respect to the substance etc. of other things[59].

(2) The second is a negative judgement. "Perhaps is not." In some respect, every thing is non-existent (*Nāstyeva sarvam*). This consists in such a negative statement.

A thing is never intended to be non-existent in respect of its own substance etc. But it cannot be said that the thing is not intended to be non-existent in respect of the substance of other things, for that would be depriving the thing of its own definite and determinate nature. Reasoning will show that a thing is non-existent in some respects. The existential and non-existential are different aspects in a thing, although they are so connected that one is impossible without the other (*Syādnāsti*).

(3) The third is an affirmative judgement and a negative judgement in succession. This predication consists in

making statements, viz.,that everything. e.g., the pitcher does not exist and that everything, e.g., the pitcher does not exist, one after the other (*Syādasti nāsti*)

(4) In some respects, everything is indescribable (*Syādavaktavyameva*)

The presence of its own nature and the absence of its contradictory nature both are in a thing together. But it cannot be expressed. But it cannot be absolutely indescribable.

(5) A thing is existent with reference to its own substance etc, and it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are simultaneously attributed to it. The fifth mode or predication consists in stating that a thing is existent and that is inexpressible (*Syādasti avaktavyam ca*)

(6) A thing is non-existent (*Niṣedhakalpanā*) with reference to the substance etc. of other things, and it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are simultaneously attributed to it. The sixth mode of predication consists in stating that a thing is non-existent and that it is inexpressible (*Syādasti* and inexpressible),

(7) A thing is existent with reference to its own substance etc. and is non-existent with reference to the substance etc, of other things, it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are attributed to it simultaneously. The seventh mode of predication consists in pointing these out[60].

Thus Jainas admit the sevenfold Judgements.

ANEKĀNTAVĀDA

Anekāntavāda is the heart of Jaina Metaphysics. The Jainas hold that a real thing is endowed with an infinite number of qualities and modes, which is comprehended by valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*)[61]. All objects of knowledge are manifold or multiform (*Anekānta*). They have infinite qualities and relations which distinguish them from the other objects. (*Ananta dharmakaṁ vastutatvam*) The claim that *Anekantavada* is the most consistent form of realism lies in the fact that Jainism has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus, the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge.

Reality according to Jainism, is not merely multiple, but each real, in its turn, is manifold of complex to its core. Reality is thus a complex of manyness (*Aneka*) and manifoldness (*Anekānta*). The central thesis of the Jaina is according to a modern critic "that there is not only diversity but each real is equally diversified. For example, a gold jar exists as a specific substance with its specific qualities in a particular place at a particular time. It does not exist as other substances in other places at other times. When it is considered as a substance, it exists as an aggregate of atoms, it does not exist as a substance in the sense of space, the principle of rest and the other substances. It exists as a collection of earth atoms, it does not exist as a collection of water atoms, fire atoms and air atoms. It exists as a collection of gold atoms and not of silver atoms or atoms of other kinds of metal. It exists as moulded into the shape of this jar, and not of any other jar. As a substance its own qualities are not many. But the qualities of the other substances are infinite. It is distinguished from them by their infinite qualities. It exists in its own place and not in other places. The qualities of the other

things in time are infinite. The gold jar is distinguished from them by infinite qualities. It exists as endowed with a particular degree of yellow colour, particular degree of taste, particular degree of smell with roughness or smoothness, heat or cold, lightness or heaviness. In size it exists either minute or large, short or long and the like in relation to other substances. It can be distinguished from other substances by infinite magnitudes. It exists as comprehended by perception or inference by an infinite number of souls. The comprehended object must differ according to its comprehending modes of knowledge. So the gold jar must be endowed with infinite natures according as it is comprehended by infinite congnitions by infinite souls. It exists in infinite relations to the other substances in infinite time. Thus all things possess infinite qualities and infinite relations[62]. The world is a system of interrelated objects possessing infinite qualities and infinite relations. This is the Jaina doctrine of relative pluralism (*Anekāntavāda*).

ATOMIC THEORY:-

The term *aṇu*, the sanskrit equivalent of atom is found in the upanisads, but the atomic theory is foreign to the *vedānta*. Of the remaining schools of Indian though, it is as we shall see a characteristic feature of more than one, the Jaina form of it being probably the earliest. The atoms according to it, are all of the same kind but they can yet give rise to the infinite variety of things. So that matter as conceived here is of quite an indefinite nature. *Pudgala* has certain inalienable features, but within the limits imposed by them it can become anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of the element is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist. Even the four-fold distinction of earth, water, fire and air is derived and secondary, not primary and eternal as believed by some Hindu thinkers like the followers of the vaiśeṣika. These so called elements also, according to Jainism, are divisible and have a structure. By developing the respective characteristics of odour, flavour etc, the atoms become differentiated though in themselves they are indistinguishable from one another, and it is from the

atoms diversified in this way that the rest of the material world is derived. Matter may thus have two forms one, simple or atomic and the other compound called *skandha*. All perceivable objects are of the latter kind[63]. Jainism also, like the upaniṣads, does not stop in its analysis of the physical universe at the elements of pṛthivi etc. It pushes it further back where qualitative differentiation has not yet taken place. But while in the latter the ultimate stage is represented by the monistic principle of Brahman, here it is taken by an infinity of atoms. It is not qualitatively only that matter is indefinite. Quantitatively also it is regarded as undetermined. It may increase or decrease in volune without addition or loss a position which is taken to be possible by assuming that when matter is in the subtle state any number of its particles may occupy the space of one gross atom. It is matter in this subtle form that constitutes *karman*, which by its influx into the jīva brings on *samsāra*.

ATHEISM OF JAINAS

The Naiyāyika accepts God as a creator and destroyer

of the world. The Jaina strongly criticizes the Nyāya argument by the following reasons. If God is the creator of the world, he creates it with a body or without a body. He cannot create it without a body because creation involves movement which is not possible without a body. If God creates the world with a body it is either perceptible or imperceptible. It is not perceptible, since grass, plants, rainbow, clouds, and the like are found to be spontaneously generated without its aid. If God's body is imperceptible what is its cause. If a special greatness is its cause, there is no reason to prove it, and it involves mutual dependence. God's imperceptible body depends upon His special greatness, and His special greatness depends upon His imperceptible body. Our body is caused by our merits and demerits but God's body cannot be caused by His merits and demerits because He is devoid of merit and demerit. Our merits and demerits also cannot be the cause of His imperceptible body. Therefore God cannot have a perceptible or imperceptible body. He cannot create the world without a body[64].

Even if God exists, He cannot be eternal, ubiquitous

and omniscient. If God is eternal, He should be absolutely eternal. He can neither create the world nor distroy it, since creation and destruction imply change and God is admitted to be unchangeable and immutable. Creation and Destruction are two distinct acts. They cannot be made by an eternal, who is not liable to change.

If God is the creator of the world, what is the motive of His creation ? intelligent being exerts himself owing to self-interest or compassion for others. So God being intelligent must create the world to serve His self-interest, or out of compassion for His creatures. But He is an enternally fulfilled being, and has no unfulfilled desires. He has no self-interest. So he cannot create the world to fulfil His selfish end, nor can He be moved by compassion for creatures. Compassion is desire to remove the sufferings of others. But before creation there is no suffering which is felt by the self through mind, body and the sense-organs in intercourse with objects, which are not yet created. If God feels compassion for sufferings of creatures before their creation, then creation will depend upon compassion and compassion will de-

pend upon creation and sufferings consequent on it. Hence God has no motive for creation.[65]

The Jainas do not believe in the existence of God. They are avowed atheists. According to them, the world is eternal and self-existent. Particular things in the world are created out of their material causes and dissolved into them. There is no creation out of nothing. There is no destruction something. The Phenomena in the world are governed by the law of casuality subservient to the moral Law of *Karman*.

But though the Jainas do not believe in God, they believe in the innate divinity of each soul. Every soul can realize its intrinsic divinity by self-effort. It can realize its infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss and infinite power. In this sense Jainism is not atheism. The Jainas worship *Arhats* with devotion. They worship also the *Siddhas*, *Acāryas*, *Upādhyāyas* and *Sādhus*. They are called five *Parameṣṭhins*. The Jainas are full of religious fervour in their worship of the idols of the great souls. They believe in worship, faith and devotion and recite mantras. They lay stress on meditation penances and right conduct for the realization of

innate divinity. But their practical religion consists in tenderness for animal life. They have developed instinctive horror of killing animals and insects. They are scrupulous vegetarians. Jainism forbids killing life, causing life to be killed and approving of killing life. It is a religion of morality without God It believes in the inexorable Law of *Karman*.

ETHICAL DISCIPLINE OF JAINAS

Liberation from bondage is the goal of life in the Jaina scheme of values. This process is the exactly the reverse of the process by which it gets into bondage. The process of life consists of two phases, the arrest of the influx of *Karman* particles (*Samvara*) and the eradication of the *karman* particles enveloping the *Jīva* (*Nirjara*).

'*Tri-ratna*' (three gems is the means for Liberation. It consists of *Samyag Darśana* (right faith), *Samyag jñāna* (right knowledge) *samyak carita* (right conduct). Of the three, knowledge is central. The Jainas attribute our passions and activity which attract *karman* to envelope the soul, to ignorance about the real nature of our own soul and the things of the world that generate passion and activity and cause even-

tual entanglement in bondage. Right knowledge (*Samyag jñānam*) alone can remove ignorance. Right knowledge can be obtained by a careful study of the teachings of Tīrthaṅkaras, who have already attained Liberation. Right knowledge consists in detailed knowledge of all truths.

But their teaching must be approached with the appropriate attitude. The attitude is characterised as Right faith. One must have faith in the teachings of the liberated souls, if one is to obtain Right knowledge, which in turn is to be the basis for Right conduct. Right faith does not mean blind faith. It is a rational and open attitude to truth. It is the minimum will to believe without which no effective study can be began. As one studies more reflects on and gains more knowledge, both faith and knowledge become perfect. They result in *kevala jñāna* or omniscience.

Right faith and Right knowledge constitute the foundation for Right conduct (*Samyak charita*). Right conduct is, what helps the soul to get rid of the *karmans* that lead to bondage. For the arrest of the influx of the new *karmans* and

the eradication of the existing ones, the following practices are prescribed.

(1) Take the five great vows (*Pañca Mahāvrata*)

(2) Practice extreme carefulness (Practice in every day speech and movements so as to avoid harming any living being.

(3) Practice restraint of thought, speech and bodily movements

(4) Practice *Dharma* of ten different kinds namely forgiveness, humility, straight forwardness, truthfulness, cleanliness, self-restraint, austerity (internal and external)Sacrifice, non-attachment and celibacy.

(5) Meditate on the cardinal truths taught regarding the self and the world.

(6) Conquer through fortitude all pains and discom forts that arise on account of the body and,

(7) Attain equanimity, purity, absolute needfulness and perfect conduct.

The five great vows are *ahimsa* (abstinence from all injury to life) *Satyam* (abstinence from falsehood which means not merely speaking what is true but speaking as well as good and pleasant), *asteyàm* (abstinence from stealing), *brahmacaryam* (abstinence from self-indulgence and not merely sexual celibacy) and *aparigraha* (abstinence from all attachment)

While the values of these five vows have been recognized and upheld by the *upaniṣads* and in Buddhism also, the Jainas are the most rigorous in trying to practice them.

NOTES

1. TS.V.30 SS.V.31-32
2. TS, V,38 & 42, SS, V, 41
3. P. 11-13,50,TDTV, 11-12
4. TS.P.272,132
5. TS P.272, 132
6. SDS, St.48.
7. SDS.P.74
8. DSG.P.3,128-129,132
9. TS.P.75.105

10. TS P.75-105
11. TS.V.8 15-67
12. TS. 11,11,14-15,24
13. TS. 33-34, TDTV. 90-92
14. DSV. 17-18, TS P 93, TDTV 95-96
15. P. TDTV, 116
16. T Sar - VIII,2,427
17. T Sar - VIII, 20-22, 24-25 &27
18. TS.5.1-2
19. PS. 2,40
20. TS. 5-6
21. TS 5-18
22. PS.14
23. SS. 5-8
24. BS. 5-7
25. SS.5-12.
26. DS.22
27. SS 312, PSD 2-49
28. PSD. 2-49
29. TDTV, 85-86

30. YBL, iii - 52
31. TDTV P.85-86.
32. PNT. 1,2,3
33. PMS V.1-3
34. PNT II. 1-2
35. PNT. ii, 8-10
36. PNT. ii. 8-10
37. PNT. III, 1-2.
38. PNT. III, 7-8
39. PNT 49,51 & 53.
40. PNT.IV,1,4-12
41. ADK; 1.34
42. VS, ii,1,30
43. MM.P.91
44. PBL.P.16
45. B.D.VI.I.P.270
46. B.D VI.I.P.271
47. PNT. P.515
48. PNT.515

49. PNT.515

50. PNT, vii, 15-21, SVM - P,

51. PNT VII, 15-21, SVM. P.202

52. PNT VII, 15-21, SVM P-202

53. PNT VII - 525-26

54. PNT, VII 2-31, SUM P.202

55. PNT, VII - 34.

56. PNT. VII, 36-38, SUM P.202

57. BD.VI.I.P.274

58. SUM. 276-77

59. JPRK. P.46

60. TDTV - 14.

61. SDSM .55

62. TRD.PP.212-18

63. SDS.P.36

64. SVM 26-28

65. SVM, P.34-35.

CHAPTER V

COMPARISON - SOME ASPECTS

SANNIKARṢA

According to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika perception depends upon the intercourse (*Sannikarṣa*) of the sense-organs with their objects. *Sannikarṣa* is the function of the sense-organs by means of which they enter into a particular relation with their appropriate objects and bring about the perception of the objects. This intercourse between the sense-organs and their object is of six kinds[1] so far as our ordinary perception is concerned viz.,

(1) Union (*Samyoga*)

(2) United inherence (*Samyukta Samavāya*)

(3) United inherent inherence (*Samyukta Samaveta Samavāya*)

(4) Inherence (*Samavāya*)

(5) Inherent inherence (*Samaveta Samavāya*)

(6) The relation of qualification and qualified

(*Viśeṣaṇata*)[2]

In addition to the above six kinds of intercourse, which are called ordinary intercourse (*Laukikasannikarṣa*), the Neo-Naiyāyikas recognize three other kinds of extra - ordinary intercourse (*Alaukika sannikarṣa*) between the sense-organs and their objects. Ordinary sensuous perception depends upon one of the six kinds of ordinary intercourse between an external or internal sense-organ and its object. But super-sensuous perception is not produced by any of these six kinds of ordinary intercourse. It is produced by an extra-ordinary intercourse. The extra ordinary intercourse is of three kinds. (1) the intercourse (with all individual objects of a particular class) through generic character-*Samānya lakṣaṇa Sannikarṣa*[3] (2) the intercourse with an object not present to a sense-organ, through its idea revived in memory - *Jñānalakṣana Sannikarṣa*[4] (3) the intercourse with remote, subtle, past and future objects produced by meditation - *yogaja Sannikarṣa*[5].

ACQUIRED PERCEPTION

According to the Neo-Naiyāyikas the visual perception of fragrant sandal is explained as due to an extra -ordinary contact (*Jñānalakṣana pratyāsakti*) through the knowledge of fragrance, though it is not the proper object of the visual organ. In western Psychology such a perception is generally regarded as acquired perception. According to the Jaina, the acquired perception is a complex psychosis made upof presentative and representative processes mechanically associated with each other and involving judgement and inference. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of a psychic compound of distinct psychic entities.

The Jaina regards the visual perception of fragrant sandal as a cause of acquired perception. The visual organ alone cannot produce the perception of fragrant sandal, since fragrance cannot be apprehended by the visual organ. Nor can the visual organ produce this perception, even in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance, for in that case, odour will be apprehended by the visual organ. So the perception of fragrant sandal can neither be perceived by the visual organ

singly, nor in co-operation with the recollection of odour. There is an apprehension of fragrant sandal after the operation of the visual organ in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance. But from this it does not follow that it is a simple psychosis of the nature of visual perception produced by the visual organ. In fact it is a complex psychosis of presentative and representative processes mixed up together. It is a mixed mode of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements mechanically associated with each other. There is an integrative association of two co-ordinate and co-existent elements in the visual perception of the sandal and the idea of fragrance is freely reproduced in memory. The apprehension of fragrant sandal is simply a sum of two distinct psychic entities, the present optic sensation of the sandal plus an image of its fragrance reproduced from past experience by association and integrated together into a complex psychosis. Though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, and the fragrance is reproduced in memory by the law of association, the apprehension of the sandal as qualified by fragrance or fragrant sandal, involves a process of judgement and

an inference. Thus according to the Jaina, in the acquired perception of fragrant sandal there is a free association of ideas, judgement and inference. An acquired perception is rather an act of inference than perception, though it depends on both perception and recollection. This account of an acquired perception is similar to the account of the associationist psychology of the west.

But the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of a mixed mode of consciousness. Every psychosis is simple. There cannot be a psychic compound because of the atomic nature of the *Manas*, without which there can be no psychosis at all. According to this view, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a simple psychosis, though it is preceded by the visual perception of the sandal and the recollection of its fragrance.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika regards cognition as it apprehends both the past condition of its object and its present condition by a synthetic act of apperception. Sense-organs can produce only perception and subconscious impression can produce only recollection, yet when they co-operate with each other

they can produce recognition which is a kind of qualified perception.

What is the object of recognition, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika? The object of recognition is something existing at present but also qualified by the past time. Thus recognition apprehends both the past and the present character of its object.

So according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, recognition is perceptual in character, though it is produced by the sense-organs - with the help of subconscious impressions.

Recognition is not a mixed mode consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements, for the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika does not admit the simultaneity of two or more cognitions owing to the atomic nature of the *Manas*. According to this view, recognition is a single presentative cognition or perception, but qualified by the past time or by the past cognition of the object. Recognition, therefore is a kind of qualified perception.

The Jaina regards recognition as a single unitary psychosis produced by perception and recollection both, which

apprehends identity of an object in the past and the present. It is neither of the nature of perception nor of the nature of recollection, nor a mechanical association of perception and recollection both nor a composite psychosis containing the two fold element of perception and recollection. It is a unique psychosis; it is 'sui generis' a single unitary psychosis. Perception apprehends the present condition of an object. Recollection apprehends the past condition of an object. Recognition which is quite a new psychosis apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present. So recognition is different from perception and recollection and its object also is different from that of perception and recollection. Thus the Jaina differs from the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas, who regard recognition as a kind of perception. For instance, wherever peripheral stimulation is present, perception is present, and wherever peripheral stimulation is absent, perception is absent. Recognition does not directly follow upon peripheral stimulation.

In fact recognition is neither perception nor recollection, but 'Sui Generis' psychosis produced by both. It is not a

kind of perception, since it is not direct and immediate knowledge.

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION.

The Jaina recognizes only two kinds of valid knowledge; direct knowledge (*Aparokṣa*) and indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa*)[6]. Knowledge is direct when it is immediate or distinct. Knowledge is indirect when it is mediate. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge because it is directly derived from the sense and the mind, while mediate knowledge (eg., inferential knowledge, verbal knowledge etc.) is derived through the medium of some other knowledge.

Perception is of two kinds *Samvyavahārika pratyakṣa* and *Mukhya pratyakṣa*[7]. The former is the ordinary perception of every day life. The latter is super-normal perception. *Samvyavahārika pratyakṣa* again is of two kinds. Perception produced by the senses (*Indriyanibandhana*)[8]. The Jaina regards the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin only as sense-organs. He does not regard the mind (*Manas*) as a sense-organ. The mind is called no-sense organ (*Anindriya*).

Hence the two varieties of ordinary perception are sense-perception and mental perception. *Mukhya pratyakṣa* is of three kinds; *Avadhi* or clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space, *Manaḥ Paryāya* or telepathic knowledge of thoughts in other minds, and *Kevala* or infinite knowledge unlimited by time and space or omniscience[9]. All of them are perceptual in nature.

The Jaina distinguishes between *Darśana* and *Jñāna*- *Darśana* is simple apprehension of an object. Just after peripheral stimulation there is the bare cognition of an object in a general way. It apprehends only its general features (*Sattāmātra*) and not its particular features. Jnana is the apprehension of the special features of an object. *Darśana* is the knowledge of aquaintance, while jnana is the knowledge about an object. *Darśana* is called indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpaka jñāna*) in other systems of philosophy. But the Jaina recognizes it as *jñāna* or knowledge. *Jñāna* is always determinate, it must have a definite form (*Sākāra*), it must apprehend the special features (*Viśeṣa*) of its object [10]. So the Jaina does not regard *Darśana* as indeterminate per-

ception, because perception is always definite and determinate.

In our ordinary perception (*Samvyavahārika pratyakṣa*) there are four stages; (i) *Avagraha* (ii) *Īhā* (iii) *Avāya* (iv) *Dhāraṇa*[11].

Gautama defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name, and well defined. In this definition, the different kinds of perception, the condition of valid perception, and the genesis of perception have been described. Perception is of two kinds, viz. indeterminate (*Avyapadeśa*) and determinate (*Vyavasāyatmaka*). We have already discussed the nature of indeterminate (*Nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*Savikalpa*) perception in detail. Perception is that cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. In this definition only the specific condition of perception has been stated. In perception there is not only the contact of the sense-organs with the *Manas*, but also the contact of the *Manas* with the self.

The contact of *Manas* with the sense organs and the contact of the *Manas* with the self are common to inference and other forms of cognition also[12]. But it may be contended that the contact of *Manas* with the sense-organs also is a specific condition of perception, which is not present in other forms of cognition also. So this condition should be distinctly mentioned. Vātsyāyana rightly points out that the contact of the sense-organ with the object is as good a distinctive feature of perception, as the contact of *Manas* with the sense-organs. So when one distintive feature has been mentioned, there is no need of mentioning the other similar features, since the definition is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all conditions of perception[13].

Uddyotakara offers other explanations too. Firstly, the sense-object contact, is the distinctive feature of every individual perception. In every individual perception which is produced by the sense-object contact, what differentiates it from every other perception is either the sense-organ concerned, or the object perceived, and each individual perception is called either after the sense-organ or after the object. For

example, the perception of colour is called either visual perception or colour perception. No perception is ever called after the mind sense-contact, the perception of colour for instance, is never called mental perception. Secondly, the mind-sense contact is the common factor among all kinds of perception, which are otherwise different. In otherwords, the contact of the mind, with the sense-organs does not differ in different kinds of perception, it remains the same in different kinds of perception. Thirdly, the mind-sense contact is not mentioned as the distinctive feature of perception. Since with regard to perception, the mind sense-contact, stands on the same footing as the mind soul-contact. Individual perceptions are never called either after the mind or after the soul. Both these contacts subsist in a substratum which is imperceptible by the senses. Neither of these two contacts belong to the perceived object, and both of these contacts subsist in the mind These are the reasons why the mind sense-contact has not been mentioned in the definition of perception[14].

Praśastapāda maintains that, just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ there is immediate apprehension

of the mere form of an object (*Svarūpamātra*). This is indeterminate perception. It apprehends an object with its generic and specific characters, but does not distinguish them from each other. It is the primal stage of perception. It is not the result of any other prior cognition[15].

Vātsyāyana recognizes a nameless perception which may be called indeterminate perception. An object may be perceived even without an apprehension of its name. When an object is perceived along with its name and their (of name and object) relation to each other, it is said to be apprehended by determinate perception. Determinate perception has the same object as indeterminate perception, but it differs from the latter in apprehending an additional factor, viz., the name of its object revived in memory by association. The former is mixed up with the verbal image of the name of its object, while the latter is free from verbal images.

Bhasarvajña defines indeterminate perception as apprehension of the bare nature of an object immediately after peripheral stimulation.

He defines determinate perception as the apprehen-

sion of an object qualified by its qualifications, such as name, substance, quality, action, genus and non-existence. The concept of name (*Samjñā*) enters into such a determinate perception as This is Devadatta. The concept of substance enters into such a determinate perception as 'The man is with a stick'. The concept of quality (*Guṇa*) enters into such determinate as 'The cloth is white'. The concept of action(*Karman*)enters into such a determinate perception as 'the man is going'. The concept of genus (*Sāmānya*) enters into such a determinate perception as 'This is a cow'. The concept of non-existence (*Abhāva*) enters into such a determinate perception as 'The ground is without a jar'[16].

Gaṅgeśa defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, genus, and the like.

Viśvanātha elaborates the view of Gaṅgeśa. He defines indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object and its generic character as unrelated to each other immediately after the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object.

Annambhaṭṭa defines indeterminate perception as the

immediate apprehension of an object with its properties without apprehending the relation between them (*Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya sambandha' navagāhi jñānam*)[17]. He defines determinate perception as the apprehension of the relation between the qualified object (*Viśeṣya*) and its qualifications (*Viśeṣaṇa*) viz., name, genus and the like (*Nāmajātyādiviśeṣana viśeṣya-sambandhāva gāhijñānaṁ*)[18]. Nīlakaṇṭha holds a slightly different view. He holds that indeterminate perception is the mere apprehension of an object (*Viśeṣya*), its qualifications (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*) without their mutual connection. He does not recognize its object as a qualified thing (*Viśeṣya*), its qualifications as qualifications (*Viśeṣaṇa*), and the relation of inherence as subsisting between the two. The mutual connection among these elements is apprehended by determinate perception. Thus unlike Viśvanātha and Annambhaṭṭa, Nīlakaṇṭha makes the relation of inherence also an object of indeterminate perception, though not the connection of the relation with the qualified object and the qualifications[19]. But he agrees with them in regarding indeteminate perception as an immediate sensory

presentation of an object. These are the views of the Naiyāyikas.

According to Jaina there are two kinds in perception- empirical and transcendental. Empirical perception is sensuous or non-sensuous. Sensuous perception is due to the external sense-organs. Non-sensuous perception is Mental perception.

The Jaina does not recognize the existence and validity of intermediate perceoption, because it cannot determine the nature of its object with its specific qualities, and because it cannot lead to attainment of good and avoidance of evil[20]. Valid knowledge is determinate cognition which apprehends itself and an object. Indeterminate perception neither apprehends itself nor apprehends an object definitely. So it is not valid. It is not distinct congnition. So it is not perception.

CONDITIONS OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas divide Perception mainly into two kinds viz.external perception and internal perception. The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that external perception depends upon

the following conditions.

The object of external perception must have extensity (*Mahattva*) or appreciable magnitude, it must be a composite of many parts (*Anekadravyavat*) and must have appreciable odour (*Udbhūtarūpa*).

The later Vaiśeṣikas agree with the older Vaiśeṣikas in holding that extensive magnitude (*Mahattva*) is the general condition of perception.

PERCEPTION OF COGNITION

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a cognition is an object of perception, but it is not perceived by itself but by another cognition through the internal organ or mind.

According to the Jaina, since cognition has self illumination, it is perceived by itself in apprehending its object, it is not perceived by any cognition.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika holds that a congnition is perceived by another cognition, which is called *anuvyavasāya*. A cognition is directly apprehended by internal perception. A cognition can never turn upon itself to make itself the object of cognition. Though a cognition manifests another object

(*Paraprakāśaka*) it can never manifest itself (*Svaprakāśaka*). It is other-manifesting but never self manifesting. But though a cognition is not manifested by itself, it can be manifested by another cognition (*Jñānam jñānāntara vedyam*)[21]. A congnition is perceived by another cognition through the mind.

THE SELF AND ITS PERCEPTION

According to the Naiyāyikas, the self is a permanent substance in which, cognition, pleasure, pain, aversion and volition inhere. It is not a series of cognitions, but a permanent principle in which they exist. It is not a stream of consciousness, but an abiding substance which becomes conscious at times. All Naiyāyikas admit that the self is an object of perception as well, while others deny it. Gautama makes the self an object of inference. It is inferred from its qualities such as pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, aversion and volition[22] Gautama no where mentions in the *Sūtras* whether the self is an object of perception or not. The self is perceived by the yogin through a particular kind of conjunction between the self and the *Manas* owing to the ecstasy of meditation. The self is an object of *yogic* perception[23]. So the self is not

an object of normal perception. It cannot be perceived by ordinary persons through the internal organ. But it can be perceived only by the *yogin* in the state of ecstasy. So the self is not an object of normal internal perception, but of supernormal perception. Here, by the self, Vātsyāyana means the pure self free from its connection with the organism.

Kaṇāda holds that the self is not an object of normal perception, but of supernormal perception. It cannot be perceived through the internal organ(*Manas*), owing to its ordinary conjunction with the self. My own self is as imperceptible as any other self[24]. But Kaṇāda admits that the self can be perceived by the yogins through a particular kind of conjunction between the self and the *Manas*. This conjunction is due to a peculiar power (*Dharma*) born of meditation. Thus, the self is an object of higher intuition.

The Jaina holds that the self is an object of internal perception. When I feel that 'I am happy' or 'I am unhappy' I have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an object of internal perception. But how can it be an object of direct and immediate apprehension or perception, though it

has no form at all ! The Jaina replies that just as pleasure can be perceived though it is without any form, so the self also can be perceived though it is without any form. When pleasure is perceived, it is not perceived apart from the self. It is perceived always as belonging to the self. Pleasure is never perceived as 'this is pleasure', as a jar is perceived as 'this is a jar'. Pleasure is always perceived as 'I am pleased' or ' I have pleasure'. Hence the perception of pleasure in the form of 'I am pleased' not only reveals pleasure but also the self. Thus the self is an object of internal perception.

The Jaina holds that the self is manifested both by external perception and by internal perception.

SUPER NORMAL PERCEPTION

Bhāsarvajña divides perception into two kinds. *Yogic* perception (*Yogipratyakṣa*) and non-*Yogic* perception (*Ayogipratyakṣa*). He defines ordinary or non-yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of gross objects produced by a particular relation between sense-organs and their objects with the help of light, time (now) space (here)

merit or demerit of the person. And he defines *Yogic* perception as direct and immediate apprehension of distant, past, future and subtle objects[25].

If yogins can perceive all objects of the world, past, present, future, hidden, subtle and remote and supersensible objects like *dharma*, etc., how do they differ from omniscient God? How does the *yogic* perception differ from divine perception? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that the difference lies in that the omniscience of yogin is produced by the constant meditation, while divine omniscience is eternal. Moreover, the divine perception of *dharma* (Moral Law) is natural to God, *dharma* constitutes the essential nature of God, which is the cause of the vedic injunctions of *dharma*. But yogins at first learn the real nature of *dharma* from the Vedic injunctions and then by unceasing practice in meditation they come to perceive it and when they acquire an intuition of it, the conception that the Vedic injunction is the ultimate standard of duty or moral obligation loses its hold upon their minds.

Praśastapāda divides *Yogic* perception into two kinds, viz., (i) *Yukta pratyakṣa* or the perception of those who are in

ecstasy, and (ii) *Viyuktapratyakṣa* or the perception of those who have fallen off from ecstasy. Those who are in a state of ecstasy can perceive their own selves, the selves of others, *ākāśa*, space, time, atoms, air, *manas* and the qualities, actions, generalities and particularities inhering in those, and inherence itself through the manas aided by the peculiar powers (*Dharma*) produced by meditation[26]. And those who have fallen off from ecstasy perceive, subtle, hidded, and remote things owing to the fourfold contact of the self, *manas*, sense-organs and objects, and virtue of the peculiar powers produced by meditations.

Similarly the Neo-Naiyāyikas divide yogic perception into two kinds:

(1) the perception of a yogin who has attained union with the Supreme Being (*Yukta*)

(2) the perception of a yogin, who is endeavouring to attain such a union (*Yuñjāna*).

The first *yogin* enjoys a constant perception of all the objects of the world, ether, atoms etc, his mind aided by a certain *dharma* born of meditation, while the second yogin

can acquire perception of all the objects with a little effort of attention or meditation[27].

The Jain divides perception into two kinds;

(1) *empirical perception*

(2) transcendental perception

Empirical perception is what we have in every day life. It is of two kinds.

(1) Sensuous perception (*Indriyanibandhana*) or perception derived from the sense-organs (i.e external sense-organs)

(2) Non-sensuous perception (*Anindriyanibandhana*) or perception derived from the mind which is not a sense organ according to Jaina.

Transcendental perception owes its origin to the self alone, it is neither derived from sense-organs nor from the mind. It is directly derived from the self owing to the destruction of the impediments to perfect knowledge. It is of two kinds viz., imperfect or deficient (*Vikala*) and perfect or complete (*Sakala*). The former again is of two kinds, viz, clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space

(*Avadhi*) and direct perception of the thoughts of others, as in telepathic knowledge of the thoughts of other minds (*Manaḥparyāya*). The latter is omniscience (*Kevalajñānam*) or the perfect knowledge of all the objects of the universe due to the complete destruction of the *karman*-matter which is an obstacle to knowledge. Thus the highest stage of transcendental perception, according to the Jaina, is omniscience (*Kevalajñāna*). The Jaina does not believe in the existence of God and consequently in divine omniscience. But he holds that the Jīva or the individual self can attain perception and omniscience by completely destroying the *karman* matter which is an obstacle to perfect knowledge. The knowledge of all objects exists in the self. But it is veiled by *karman*-matter. When the veil of *karman* matter encrusting the self is completely destroyed, the self realizes its omniscience[28]. This perfect intuition of the whole universe is not produced by the external sense-organs or by the internal organ of mind as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say.

According to some, the external sense-organs aided by the merit born of meditation can apprehend past, future,

distant and subtle-objects. But the sense-organs can never be free from their inherent imperfections. Prabhācandra argues that even the sense-organ of *yogin* can never enter into direct connection with super sensible objects (e.g.atoms) like ours because they are after all sense-organs. What is the nature of the aid rendered by the peculiar power (*Dharma*) born of meditation to the sense-organs? Does the *dharma* born of meditation increase the capacity of the sense-organs when they function with regard to their objects (e.g.atoms) ? Or does it merely assist the sense-organs when they operate on their own objects ? The first alternative is untenable because the sense-organs by themselves can never operate on atoms, etc. If they operate on atoms, etc., they do not stand in need of the aid of the dharma born of yoga, and if they operate on atoms etc, only when they are aided by the *dharma*, then there is a circular reasoning. The *dharma* born of *yoga* increases the capacity of the sense-organs operate on atoms, etc, when they are aided by the *dharma* born of *yoga* cannot increase the capacity of the sense-organs, it merely assist them in operating on supersensible objects like atoms, etc. The aid of dharma

rendered to the sense-organs in their apprehension of super-sensible objects is needless.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the internal organ (*Manas*) with the aid of the *dharma* born of *yoga* can simultaneously produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world, past, future, remote and subtle. But Prabhācandra contends that the *Manas* which is regarded as atomic by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world simultaneously and therefore, cannot produce a knowledge at the same time. Otherwise there would be a simultaneous perception of all the qualities of a cake, eg. its taste, colour, odour, etc. at the time of eating it. It is not admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In fact the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of simultaneous cognition owing to the atomic nature of the mind. So it cannot produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world at the same time, even when it is aided by the *dharma* born of *yoga*. The atomic mind cannot enter into relation with many objects at the same time by contradicting its very nature. It is more reasonable to maintain that it is the self which apprehends all the objects of

the world independently of the mind by virtue of the specific powers born of meditation. It is useless to suppose that the self knows an infinite number of objects through the atomic mind at the same time. If it be argued that the mind of a *yogin* enters into relation with all objects of the world not simultaneously, then there is no difference between the perception of *yogin* and that of an ordinary person. Hence Prabhācandra concludes that the atomic mind can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world at the same time. But it may be argued that the mind of a *yogin* enters into relation with all the objects of the world through its relation with God, who is ubiquitous and consequently related to everything in the world. Prabhācandra contends that the mind of the *yogin* can enter into relation with the present objects only through its union with God, but never with past and future objects, since they are non-existent at the time when the mind enters into union with him. Hence the Jaina concludes that omniscience can never be produced either by the external organs or by the so called internal organ or mind, though they are aided by the peculiar powers born of meditation.

According to the Jaina, there is no eternal omniscient God, but the finite self can attain omniscience when all the *karman* matter is totally destroyed, which is an impediment to right knowledge. And this omniscience is not derived through the channel of the external sense-organs or the internal organ of mind. And further, the Jaina holds that constant meditation cannot produce omniscience until and unless the *karman* matter, which is an impediment to right knowledge, is wholly destroyed. Here lies the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina views. Just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proves the existence of omniscient by the ontological argument, just as heat is subject to varying grades and consequently reaches the highest limit so right knowledge which is subject to varying grades owing the various degrees of *karman*-matter impeding. It reaches the highest limit of omniscience when the hindrance of the four kinds of *karman*-matter is completely destroyed. Omniscience is not derived from authority or scripture because it can never give us a direct and distinct knowledge which characterizes omniscience. Nor can it be aerived from inference for the same reason.

Nor can it be derived from peripheral organs or the central organ of mind, as we have found already. Hence it is neither verbal, nor inferential nor sensuous. It is a transcendendal perception of the whole world, produced by the complete decay and destruction of the *karman* matter. *It is a distinct* perception of all supersensible objects of the world on the complete destruction of *karman* or infra-sensible particles of matter which encrust the self[29].

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION

Vātsyāyana defines recollection as recalling and recognizing an object perceived in the past by the same self. One and the same self perceived it in the past, remembers it at present, and recognize it as an object of the past experience. Recollection appears in the form of 'I have known it before'. The definition implies the following characteristic of recollection

(1) Recollection Pre-supposes a past apprehension of an object by the self.

(2) It presupposes an impression (*Saṁskāra*) pro

duced by the past apprehension in the same self.

(3) It pre-supposes the awakening(*Udbodha*) of the impression by (*Udbodhaka*). eg.,the perception of a similar object and the like.

(4) It implies recognition of the recalled object as perceived in the past by the same self.

(5) Recollection implies temporal localization in the past. The object recalled and recognized is referred to a particular time in the past.

(6) Recollection pre-supposes the identity of the self. The self that recalls an object is the same as perceived it in the past.

If there were no identity of the self, there would be no recollection. Udayana asserts that the past perfection, its impression, and its recollection must subsist in the same self, that otherwise one's impression would produce another's recollection[30]. Hence recollection implies the identity of the self which is endowed with the essential nature of knowing the past, present and the future[31]. It implies retention (*Dhāraṇa*) and recall (*Smṛti*). It presupposes original appre-

hension, retention of its impression (*Saṁskāra*), and recall and recognition of the object apprehended in the past by the same self. This is the Nyāya view of recollection.

Māṇikyanandin, a Jaina Philosopher, defines recollection as a cognition in the form of 'that' which is produced by the revival of an impression[32]. For example, Devadatta was perceived in the past and that Devadatta is remembered at present. Vidyānanda Svāmin asserts that recollection is a cognition that assumes the form of 'that', and that it cognizes an object which was perceived in the past[33]. It is a representative cognition as distinguished from a presentative cognition. If the past perception of Devadatta, Bhaṭṭa-Akalanka observes, did not cognize itself, then the present recollection would be a novel knowledge and consequently cease to be recollection. But it is an already acquired knowledge devoid of novelty, and therefore a reproduction of a past perfection which congnized itself. This is the Jaina view of recollection.

NATURE OF THE SENSE - ORGANS

The Jaina recognizes five sense-organs - organs of touch, taste, smell, vision and audition[34]. The tactual organ pervades the whole body. The Jaina does not regard the mind as a sense-organ. (*Anindriyam manaḥ*)[35].

Jaina conceives the soul as pervading the whole body. A particular kind of sense-perception is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with a particular sense-organ. In Jaina view of the physical sense-organs the visual organ is *aprāpyakārin* ; it does not come into direct contact with its object[36]. The Jaina holds that the visual organ apprehends objects at a distance with the help of light. But he does not explain the nature of the action of light upon the visual organ. All the other sense-organs are *prāpyakārins*, they come into direct contact with their objects[37]. But the direct contact may be gross (*Sthūla*) or subtle (*Sūkṣma*). The organs of touch and taste come into contact with gross objects. But the organs of smell and hearing come into contact with subtle objects. The organ of smell has direct contact with minute particles of the object smelt. The organ of hear-

ing has direct contact with merely a kind of motion. Sound is due to the knocking of one physical object against another. It is the agitation set up by this knock. The auditory organ comes into contact with this motion.

Gautama establishes the existence of five sense-organs. The existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five distinct functions (*Indriyārtha pañcatvāt*)[38]. Vātsyāyana explains that there are five purposes (*Prayojana*) of the senses touching, seeing, smelling, tasting, and hearing : these five purposes require five distinct sense - organs. The function of the sense-organ cannot be performed by another. So the existence of five sense organs is inferred from five kinds of sense-activities[39], and from the five - fold character of the sense - organs, (A) the shape of perception, (B) the sites (C) the processes, (D) the forms and (E) constituents [40].

(A) There are five different kinds of perception-visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual,from which we infer the existence of five sense - organs [41].

(B) there are five sense-organs corresponding to the five sites (*Adhiṣṭhāna*) or end organs. The tactual organ, which

is indicated by the perception touch, has its seat throughout the body. The visual organ issuing out to the object as indicated by the perception of colour has its site in the pupil of the eye, etc. The diversity of the sense-organs is proved by the diversity of their locations.

The sense-organs are different from their physical seats.

(C) The five sense- organs involve different processes (*Gati*). The visual organ, which is of the nature of light, issues out of the pupil and moves out to the objects endowed with colour. The tactual organ, the gustatory organ and the olfactory organ come into contact with their objects resting in their own sites. They do not move out to their objects like the visual organ. The auditory organ also doesnot move out to their objects. Sound travels from its place of origin to the auditory organ in a series of waves, This argument shows that all the sense-organs are *prāpyakārins*, they apprehend their objects by coming into direct contact with them.

(D) The five sense-organs have different magnitudes (*Ākṛti*). The olfactory organ, the gustatory organ and the tac-

tual organ have the magnitudes of their sites, they are co-extensive with their seats.

(E) The five sense-organs have their origin (*Jāti*) in five material elements. The olfactory organ is made up of earth and apprehends smell which is its characteristic quality. The gustatory organ is made up of water and apprehends taste, which is its characteristic quality. The visual organ is made up of light and apprehends colour which is its characteristic quality. And the auditory organ is nothing but *ākāśa* and apprehends sound which is its characteristic quality[42]. There is a community of nature between the sense-organs and their objects. A sense-organ apprehends the distinctive quality of that substance which enters into its constitution. The Vaiśeṣika also agrees with this view.

Gautama does not distinctly mention any where that the mind (*Manas*) is a sense-organ. But Vātsyāyana points out that Gautama's definition of perception, as a non-erroneous cognition produced by intercourse of the sense organs with their objects inexpressible by words and well-defined, implies that the mind is a sense-organ. If by the sense-organs

he means only the external senses, his definition will apply only to the perceptions of external objects. But Gautama does not give a separate definition of internal perception of pleasure and the like. This shows that his definition covers both external perception and internal perception, and the mind is a sense-organ[43].

Vātsyāyana includes the mind in the sense-organs and points out its distinction from the external senses[44]. Viśvanātha regards the mind as a sense organ. He argues that the perception of pleasure must be produced through an instrument just as the visual perception of colour is produced through the instrument of the eyes, and this instrument is the mind (*Manas*) which is thus a sense-organ (*Kāraṇa*)[45]. Prasastapada describes the mind as the internal organ (*Antaḥkaraṇa*). He argues that pleasure and pain are not perceived through external organs, but that they must be perceived by an instrument and that is the mind[46]. Śaṅkara Miśra also gives the same argument[47]. Gautama does not include the *manas* (Mind) in the list of sense-organs[48]. He mentions it separately among the objects of valid knowledge (*Prameya*)[4]. Kaṇāda is silent

on the point. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers generally regard the manas as the internal organ through which we perceive pleasure and pain [49].

The Jaina does not regard the manas as a sense organ. It is called *anindriya*. It is not a sense organ[50]. Vidyānandin argues that the mind is not a sense-organ because it has no specific objects. The sense organs apprehend specific objects. One sense-organ cannot apprehend the objects of another. But the mind can apprehend all objects. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ. It may be argued that the mind is an instrument (*Kāraṇa*) of cognition, and so it must be regarded as a sense-organ. But in that case smoke also would be a sense-organ, since it is an instrument (*Kāraṇa*) of cognition, being a mark (*Linga*) of inference. Hence it is wrong to include the mind in the sense-organs [1].

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that all the sense-organs are *prāpyakārins*; they apprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with them. This doctrine is called the doctrine of *prāpyakāritā*.

The Jaina holds that only the visual organ is

aprāpyakārin, it apprehends its object at a distance with the help of light without getting at it.

INDIAN NOMINALISM AND REALISM

In the eastern thought there are mainly three theories of the Universal,viz.,Nominalism, conceptualism and Realism.

According to Nominalism, there is no Universal at all either in nature or in the mind. According to conceptualism, the Universal exists only in the mind. According to realism, the universal exists both in nature and in the mind. Among the Indian thinkers, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas represent different schools of realism. The Jaina is a nominalist tending towards realism.

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that there is a real Universal or class-essence in the individual of nature, i.e.Universal, and the relation between them is that of inherence.

The Jaina holds that there can be no universal notion in the mind, unless there is a real Universal in nature. The Jaina

does not recognize its existence. There can be no one, eternal,ubiquitous class essence in the individuals belonging to the same class, as the realist supposes.

NOTES

1. TSG.P.25
2. TSG.P.25
3. SM P.277
4. SM P.279
5. SM P.282
6. PMS, P.2
7. PMS, III,1-2, PMS,II 5
8. PMS, II,5
9. PNT, II, 19-20 & 23.
10. DSV. 4
11. PNT, II.6, UTS,I.15
12. NBL, I,1,4
13. NBL, I,1,4
14. N.V I,1,4
15. NBL, I,1,4
16. NSPP, P.14

17. TSD. P.30

18. TSD.P.30 (Ibid P.30)

19. TSN; P 42.

20. PNT, II, 4-5

21. PKM, P.34.

22. NS, I,1,10

23. NBL, I.1.9

24. VSU, VIII,1,2.

25. NSar, P.3 and NTD, P.82.

26. PBL, P.187, NP.PP 72-75

27. BLP 65, SM, PP 284-85, HIP, I,P.P. 472-73

28. PNT, ch ii,4,5,18-23, PMS. II,ii, HIP, II, PP.189-90

29. PKM P.65

30. Kir, P.149, KVP, PP.154,160

31. NVTT, P.403

32. PMS iii,3

33. PRP, P.69

34. TS, II,19

35. PMV, II,5

36. Tattvarthasara, II, 49. P.69 (Culcutta)

37. Tattvarthasara II,49.

38. NS III, 1,58

39. NBh, III,1,58

40. NS, III,1,62

41. NBh III,1,62

42. NBh, III,1,62, NM.P.477

43. NBh.I,1,4

44. NBh, I,1,4

45. SM - 85

46. PBh. PP 152-3 Kir P 153

47. VSU, III,2,2

48. N.S.I,1,12

49. NBh, NV, I,1,4, NM.P484, SM P.397, VSU, III 2,2

50. D.S

CHAPTER VI

COMPARISON - MAIN PRINCIPLES

GOD

The concept of God is almost the same to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They believe in God as the eternal, Omniscient and efficient cause of the world. But the Jaina view is entirely different from this. They do not believe in the existence of God.

Kaṇāda did not clearly mention God[1]. He probably traces authority of the Vedas to the seers, who preceive supersensible objects like merit, demerit etc. But his commentator Praśastapāda regards God as the efficient cause of the world and atoms as its material cause. The Vaiśeṣikas also believe that God is the author of the Vedas, who is free from error, inadvertence and deficiency of the sense-organs. He is the promulgator of the moral law.

According to the Naiyāyikas, God is a particular soul endowed with merit, knowledge, intuition and sovereignity. He is devoid of demerit and false knowledge. He creates the world of manifold objects in accordance with the merits and demerits of the finite souls for their enjoyments and sufferings.

God is omniscient, Omnipotent and morally perfect[2]. He is the moral guide of the individual souls and dispensor of the action. He is the efficient cause of the world and directs the atoms. He arranges the mountains, rivers and other material objects.

The Jaina philosophy denies God in many ways. They say that, it is impossible to God to create with a body or without a body. If he creates with a body, it is either perceptible or imperceptible. It is not perceptible, since grass, plants etc are found to be spontaneously generated without its aid, and if it is imperceptible it involves mutual dependence.

According to the Jaina, body is caused by merits and demerits. God is devoid of merit and demerit. So he cannot have a perceptible and imperceptible body. Creation and de-

uction are two distinct acts. They cannot be made of an rnal, who is not liable to change. So God is not eternal[3].

Jaina philosophy also says that He has no self inter-. So He cannot create the world to fulfil His selfish end. r can he be moved by compassion for creatures[4].

The Jainas believe that the world is eternal and self istent. There is no creation out of nothing, and no destruc- n of something to nothing. So they denied the existence of d.

The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika philosophies believe in the ex- ence of God, while the Jaina denies it. This is one of the in differences between them.

The Jaina Philosophy rejects the existence of God, but the same time they believe in the innate divinity of each l. They worship *Arhats* with devotion and the *sādhus*, *āryas, upādhyāyas* etc.

LF (*ĀTMAN*)

The Nyāya arguments for the existence of the finite ul are similar to the Vaiśeṣika view. There are slight varia-

tions in the view of Jaina in this matter.

The Naiyāyikas accept sixteen categories, viz., *pramāṇa, prameya* etc[5]. They include the self in the second category, *prameya.* According to the Vaiśeṣikas there are seven categories. They considered the self as a substance- the first category. The Jainas divided the categories into two, viz., *jīva* and *ajīva*. The *jīva* means self.

The three philosophies admit inference to prove the existence of the soul. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept, Testimony also to prove the existence of the soul. The Naiyāyikas admit perception to prove the self. But the Vaiśeṣikas deny it.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the self has pleasure, pain, aversion, and desire from which they infer the self. The self is the substratum of recognition and recollection.

The vital acts of inspiration and expiration, the growth of the body and apperception are some other arguments to prove the existence of one's own self.

According to them it is eternal ubiquitous, and devoid of origins and end. It has pre-existence and undergoes transmigration until it achieves liberation. The self earns merits

and demerits by the action of it in the past. There merits and demerits (*Adṛṣta*) and the divine will control the soul in future.

In the state of liberation the finite soul retains its intergrity and is not merged in God. Thus, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of the soul is the same.

The Jaina concept is different from this. According to them the *jīvas* are eternal, spiritual substance. It is uncorporeal, immaterial and different from the body. It is characterized by infinite intelligence, infinite peace etc.

The Jaina argues that the magnitude of the *jīva* depend upon the body in which it involves. The soul of an elephant and an ant is different in its shape, because of the dimension of their body.

Cognition, feeling etc are the *jīva's* qualities. Consciousness is not its accidental quality but it constitutes its essence.

According to the Jaina the souls are of two kinds - bound and liberated[6]. The bound soul is blinded by ignorance on account of its bondage to *Karman* - matter and roams about

in the world of birth and death. The faithful soul is liberated from this. The liberated soul moves upward to the summit of mundane space, and it is free from bodily adjuncts.

The concept of soul of the Jaina is different from the concept of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. In the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika system, in the case of soul, God has an important role. But the Jainas did not accept a God as a conductor of soul. According to them the *jīvas* freely do actions. The Jainas give a shape to the soul, - the shape of the body in which it dwells. But the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas do not do so.

These are the main differences among the three philosophies in the concept of soul.

MIND

In Indian Philosophy mind is distinct from the self or *Ātman*, and it is a subtle matter. This concept is common to almost all systems of Indian Philosophy. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the mind is an internal organ. But the Jainas do not regard the mind as a sense-organ. To them it has an important role in the perceptual knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas include the *Manas* in the second category *Prameya*[7], while the Vais̀eṣikas consider it as a *Dravya*. The Jainas do not consider it as a category.

The Nyāya-Vais̀eṣika view of mind is similar in many ways. They maintain that mind is the internal organ, which is the instrument of directly knowing pleasure, pain etc. According to them it is an immaterial, uncorporeal, partless, atomic unconscious and eternal substance. The existence of *Manas* is inferred from the non-production and production of perception at particular times. Here, when the mind is absent there is no perception and when the mind is present there is perception. The conjuctions of the self with the mind, of the mind with the sense-organs and of the sense-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of perception. Recollection also proves the existence of the mind.

The non-simultaneity of the qualities prove that the mind is one in each body. It has no specific qualities. The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions from the different senses indicates the existence of mind.

But there are some peculiarities in the Jaina philoso-

phy. Their view is different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Jaina does not regard the mind as a sense-organ. According to them, the mind is *anindriya*. It is not a sense-organ because it is different from sense-organs. The sense-organ apprehend specific objects. One sense-organ cannot apprehend the objects of another. But mind can apprehend all objects. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ.

According to the Jaina philosophy mind has an important role in the perceptual knowledge and it is also the instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge. The objects of sense-perception are also objects of mind. Mind is also a sense of internal perception and it acquires knowledge of everything, in the sense that it is not subject to the limitations which we find in the case of five sense-organs. The five sense-organs have limitation, but the mind is not subject to limitation. It acquires knowledge of everything. Mind is defined as *kāraṇa* or instrument of the self. This shows that in this matter the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina concepts of mind are similar, but the Jaina does not consider the mind as a sense-organ. This is one of the differences between them.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika admits the mind as an internal organ while the Jaina denies it. In their view it is an instrument of the self.

According to the Jaina mind is both physical and non-physical. When it is made of *Pudgalas* or matters it is called *Dravyamanas*. But in other aspects, it is non-physical or conscious and it is called *Bhavamanas*. *Bhava* is the conscious aspect of mind.

In the view of the Jaina philosophy the mind is *Aprāpyakārin* because there is no direct contact between the object and the mind. They point out that if the mind is *Prāpyakārin*, it would go out of its place and meet the objects near or far in the state of waking as well as sleep, but in practice, we do not find this. So the mind is *Aprāpyakārin*.

In Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view the mind is an eternal substance. The Jainas do not agree with it. They say that the mind is both eternal and non-eternal. It is eternal only in the sense that it is constituted by *Pudgalas*, which are eternal, with the aspects of its qualities or *paryāya*. It is not eternal because the qualities of the mind pleasure, pain etc, are changing.

The Jainas also deny the Naiyāyika view that the mind is atomic. According to the Jaina mind is *Madhyamaparimānin*. If mind is atomic it could not come into contact with the self, at the same time, as it has contact with the sense organs.

The Jaina denies the Naiyāyika theories of mind's atomism, eternalism and also denies that the mind is a sense-organ or internal organ. So in the concept of mind, the Jainas have dissimilarities as well as similarities to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

LIBERATION

Life is a complicated one and people seek more and more peace and happiness. According to the philosophies to attain Liberation is the ultimate aim of mankind. Men always do endless effort to avoid sorrow and to attain happiness. This is the nature of human beings. Among the pursuits of human life, (*Puruṣārtha* - viz., *Dharma, Artha, Kāma* and *Mokṣa*). *Mokṣa* is the highest pursuit. Even the illiterate people of India accept the concept of *Mokṣa* as a religious faith.

All the philosophical systems try to explain the idea of Liberation from their own point of view. For example, the Cārvāka philosophy has a materialistic conception of Liberation. They say that liberation is the destruction of the body (*Dehocchedo Mokṣa*). In the Buddhist philosophy *Nirvāṇa* is at least the arrest of the stream of consciousness leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future. In Nyāya philosophy Liberation is freedom from pain. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, Liberation is the absolute destruction of the nine specific qualities of the soul. In Jaina philosophy Liberation is the total deliverance of the soul from all karmic bondage.

In the view of Naiyāyikas, the true knowledge of the categories ultimately leads to the Liberation, through the destruction of merits and demerits. Release can be attained by the intuition of the self. It destroys false knowledge. There is a cessation of each member of the following series - pain, birth,activity, defect and wrong notion - cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it, and this ultimately leads to the final release[8].

Vaiśeṣika view of Liberation is similar to the view of

Naiyāyikas. According to them Liberation is the complete extinction of nine specific qualities of the soul, viz., Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and impression. In the state of Liberation the soul is free from all these qualities. The Vaiśeṣikas propound a doctrine of inherent felicity in the state of *Mokṣa*.

On the other hand, Liberation from bondage is the goal of life in Jaina Philosophy. *Mukti* is the total and final freedom of the soul from all *karmic* matter, owing to the non-existence of the cause of bondage and the shedding of all the *karmans*. *Mokṣa* is of two types - *Bhāvamokṣa* (objective liberation) and *Dravya mokṣa* (subjective liberation). When the soul is free from *gatikarmans*, viz., *Jñānavaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya mohanīya* and *antarāya,* it is *bhāvamokṣa* and when it is free from *agatikarmans* viz. *nāma, vāyu, gotra, vedanīya* it is *Dravya mokṣa.* After the attainment of *kevalajñāna*, a person is free from all kinds of *karmans* and attains final Liberation. *Triratna* or three gems, viz., right knowledge, right faith, right conduct - are the means of liberation. Among the three, right knowledge alone can remove

ignorance.

As the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Jainas also believe that liberation is the ultimate goal of life and it is the freedom from all bodily bondage and pain. Among the three philosophies, there are some similarities in the view of *Mokṣa*, but the Jaina narrates it in a long process, viz., *āsrava, samvara, nirjara* etc.

Mokṣa is a rediscovery of man himself through self realization. True happiness lies within. "Look within" is what Jainism says. The ideal of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina Philosophy is self realization.

ATOMIC THEORY

Atoms or *Paramāṇus* are the non-spatial, indivisible and eternal units of physical substance. They are spherical and supersensible. They can be perceived by *Yogins* and God. Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika System gave the idea of atom to the world for the first time. The Indian Philosophies like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Jaina, Bauddha admitted the theory of atom.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika earth, water, fire and air are eternal as atoms[9] and non-eternal as composite products. The world is created by the atoms [10].

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have different opinions about *pāka*. It is one of the differences between them. The Vaiśeṣika view is that when a pot comes into contact with heat, it becomes split as atoms, the atoms change their colour, and then they combine into the form of a pot. This doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika is known as the doctrine of *Pīlupāka* [11].

On the other hand, in the opinion of *Naiyāyikas*, heat changes the colour of the pot and the atoms at the same time; they never split into atoms. This doctrine is known as *Piṭharapāka*[12].

Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Jaina Philosophy also believes that the construction of the universe is under the theory of atoms. All things in the world are created by atoms. The atoms are eternal, incorporeal and indivisible parts. As the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Jainas also say that the atoms are perceived by the *kevalins*[13].

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas the creation and de-

struction of the universe are by the will of God. The Jainas reject this. According to them creation and destruction are caused by *Ākāśa, dharma* and *adharma*[14]. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas describe the atoms as *dvyaṇuka, tryaṇuka,* etc. The Jainas describe it as *skandhas* and molecules.

So among the Jaina and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, there are some similarities and dissimilarities in the case of atomic theory.

NOTES

1. B.D.P.217
2. NM.P.184-187
3. B.D. VI.I.P.300
4. BD VI.I P.306
5. NS.I.1.1
6. B.D.VI I P.283.
7. NS.I.1.9.
8. NS.NBh.I.1.2
9. TSG.P.3
10. TSG.P.10
11. HIP.VL.1.P.327

12. HJP.VI.P.327

13. B.D.VI.I.P.288

14. BD.VI.I.P.289.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina Philosophies have some similarities and some dissimilarities among them. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophies are known as samānatantras, but the Jaina philosophy is fundamentally different from them. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas belong to the *Āstika darśanas* because they admit the authority of the Vedas and God. The Jaina Philosophy belongs to the *Nāstika* school, because it reject the authority of Vedas and God. This is one of the main differences between them.

Jainism is one of the important religions in the world, which contains the great principles of *Ahimsa*, Tolerance, truth etc and the followers of the Jaina religion are spread in different parts of the world. Their religious thoughts are reflected in their philosophy. The *Syādvāda, Anekānta vada*, etc., give a special image to Jaina Philosophy. *Syādvāda* helps man to look at life from many points of view.

The *Nyāya sūtra* of Gautama and the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* of Kaṇāda do not clearly mention God, but the later schools of Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas are theists. They believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and morally perfect God. They also believe that the creation and destruction of the world are according to the will of God. But the Jainas are atheists. In their view there is no need of a God for the destruction and creation of the world. They only believe in the Tīrthaṅkaras and *Arhats*.

The concept of *Ātman* is the same in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. There are slight variations in the view of Jaina in this matter. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the soul is eternal and ubiquitous. It has pre-existence and undergoes transmigration until it achieves liberation. The Jaina view is different from this. According to it, the soul is eternal, uncorporeal, immaterial, and spiritual substance. In addition to this the Jainas ascribe a magnitude to the soul. They say that the magnitude of the soul depends upon the body in which it involves.

In the concept of mind there are some dissimilarities among the three philosophies. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view is

that mind is an immaterial, uncorporeal, partless, atomic and eternal substance. For them mind is an internal organ. But the Jaina philosophy does not regard mind as a sense organ. They also deny the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the mind is atomic.

The Nyāya- philosophy accepts four *pramāṇas*, viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal Testimony. The Vaiśeṣikas accept only two *Pramāṇas* - Perception and Inference. They say that the Comparison and Verbal Testimony are included in Inference. The Jaina philosophy divides *Pramāṇas* on two bases - Perception and Non Perception. To the Jainas, cognition resulting from the contact of sense organs with the objects is indirect knowledge (opposed to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). Our ordinary perception, the perception of the proximity to the self, the cognition of eye, the perception born in mind, etc., are included in the division of perception. The non-perceptual knowledge includes Recollection, Recognition, Reasoning, Inference and Verbal Testimony.

Like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy Jaina philosophy also mentions the great elements of *Pṛthvi, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu* and *Ākāśa* in different contexts. The first four except *Ākāśa* are

included in the *Pudgala dravya*. In the Jaina philosophy there is no qualitative difference among them, because they are only the different form of *Pudgala*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not agree with this view of the Jaina. For them, earth, water, fire and air are absolutely different and independent substances; their atoms are also ultimately distinct and different.


The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas represent different schools of realism, while the Jaina philosophy represents the school of nominalism.

To attain liberation is the ultimate goal of the three philosophies. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas liberation is the complete extinction of ignorance. They say that liberation is from the real knowledge of the things. For them *Mokṣa* is the freedom of the soul from rebirth. The Jaina view is that liberation is the total and final freedom of soul from all *karmic* matter. After the attainment of *Kevalajñāna*, a person is free from all kind of *karmans*. *Tri-ratna* or three gems, viz., right knowledge, right faith and right conduct are the means of liberation. Among the three, right knowledge alone can remove ignorance.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina systems with some similarities and dissimilarities stand on their individual grounds and principles and preach a path of salvation, which is the ultimate goal of these three philosophies.

APPENDIX

PRAMĀṆAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY



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